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Abstract 
Consumption of addictive substances poses a challenge to economic m odels of ratio-
n al , forward-looking agents. This dissertation presents a theoretical and empirical 
examination of consumption of addictive goods. 
The theoretical model draws on evidence from psychology and nem obiology to 
improve on the st andard assumptions 11secl in intertemporal cons11mption studies. I 
model agents who may misperceive the severity of the future consequences from con-
suming addictive substances and allow for an agent 's environment to sh ap e her pref-
erences in a systematic way suggested by numerous studies tha t have found craving to 
be induced by the presence of environmental cues associated with past substance use. 
The b ehavior of agents in this behavioral model of addiction can mimic the pattern 
of quitting and relapsing that. is prevalent among addictive substance users. 
Chapter 3 presents an empirical analysis of the Becker and Mmphy (1988) model 
of rational addiction using data on grocery store sales of cigarettes. This essay empir-
ically tests the model's predictions concerning consumption responses to future and 
past price changes as well as the prediction that t he response to an anticipated price 
change differs from the response to an unanticipated price change. In addition, I 
consider the consumption effects of three institutional chan ges that occnr dnring the 
time p eriod 1996 through 1999. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Schelling (1978) proposes that consumption of addictive goods is an anomaly in con-
sumer theory b ecause "consumers [are] getting negative satisfaction out of something 
they spend a lot of money to consume" (p. 293) . Unless these con sumers prefer 
"negative" satisfaction, this anomaly poses a cha llenge to modern economic theory. 
I t appears, however , t hat this phenomenon can be understood once the standard 
restrictive assumptions of dynamic models of consumption are relaxed . 
This thesis presents an economic model of consumpt ion of addictive goods. Un-
like previous economic models of addiction , this model can generate behavior t hat 
resembles the pattern of quitting and relapse that is extremely prevalent among ad-
dictive substan ce users . The standard economic model of addiction is the "rationa l 
addiction" model of Becker and Mnrphy (1990) . This t hesis includes an empirical 
analysis of this m odel. 
Habit formation models, such as P ollak (1970) , Ryder and Heal (1973) and Boyer 
(1978), relax the assumption of intertemporal sep aration of utility. They allow u t ility 
of current con sumption to depend on past consumption . The m acroeconomic theory 
research by Ryder and Heal (1973) and Boyer (1978) finds that the assmnption of 
intertemporally dependent preferences can substantially ch ange the optimal growth 
path of an economy. The more relevant stndy is Pollak's study, which finds that 
the relaxation of th e assumption of intertemporal separability also leads to different 
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optimal behavior on the individua l level. For example, long-run demand functions 
differ from short-run demand functions . Pollak, however, implicitly assumes that 
agents arc myopic. 
The rational choice model of addiction was first introduced by Stigler and Becker 
(1977) in an attempt to demonstrate that m any b ehavioral phenomena, including 
addiction, can be modeled without the assumption of a ch ange in tastes over time. 
The model of rational addiction was flnther developed hy Becker and M 11rphy ( 1988). 
Like P ollak, Becker and Mnrphy focus on individual behavior. However , they assmn e 
that individuals are fully aware of the effect of their current con sumption on future 
consumption. They find that consumption patterns consistent with addiction result 
from forward-looking u tility maximization with stable preferences. 
Orphanides and Zervos address the criticism of the Becker and Murphy model 
that addicts in their model are "h appy addicts" in t hat they choose t heir addiction. 
In the Orphanidcs and Zervos model, agents arc uncertain as to whether or not they 
will experience negative side effects as a result of past consumption. By the time th e 
individual realizes his trne type, he m ay already be addicted. Their model captures 
the same characteristics of addictive goods as Becker and Murphy, but it also offers 
an explanation for such things as experimentation with addictive substances; th e 
sinmltancous existence of casual users, addicts, and non-users; and the role of drug 
education programs . 
The work presented in the subsequent chapters follows directly from this line of 
research , but it is also strongly influenced by research in other disciplines. The mod-
3 
els most. similar to th0 one tha t I develop are those tha t Rt.r ess the importance of 
environmenta l cues in expla ining the consumption patterns of those who consume 
addic tive goods (Laibson , 1999 and Loewens tein, 1999) . Both papers draw on neu-
robiological and psychological evidence tha t environnwntal cues associated with past 
consumption of addic tive substances can induce craving. In Laibson 's model , past 
behavior in a certain environment. only affects curren t. utility if the agent is current ly 
in that environment. His model demonstra t es how it is possible for an agent to be 
addicted in one onvironm0nt, but no t another. In addi t ion to the characteristics of 
addiction tha t Boeker and Mnrphy ex plain, Laibson's model can also explain shor t-
term impatience with regard to consmnption of addictive goods . Loewenst ein finds 
tha t ntility derived from consuming tho addic tive good decreases over t ime, while, 
simultaneously, the craving tho agent. experiences inC1·oascs in severity if he abstains 
from consuming the good in t he presence of the environmental cue. 
There arc also m odels of addic tion arising from self-control problems. In some 
models agents have two personalities with distinct preferences (soc Schelling, 1978; 
Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; or Winston, 1980) . In other mod els, agents are simply 
over-attentive to present well-being a t the expense of futmo well-being (O 'Donoglme 
and Rabin, 1999 or Grnber and Koszcgi, 1999). Both typ es of self-control models 
predict that individuals may choose to cons train t heir choice sot in order to control 
or prevent addiction. 
"Adjnst.mont cost" theories of addiction (Jones, 1999 or Snranovic, Goldfarb and 
Leonard , 1999) model utility from cmront consnmption as depending on a reference 
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level of consumption, which is a function of past consumption. The disutility from 
decreasing cmTent consumption below the reference level is greater in magnitnde than 
the utility from increasing consumption beyond the reference level. 
Chapter 2 presents a behavioral model of addiction. The model adds to the lit-
erature by expla ining the cycle of quitting and relapse that is extremely common 
in snbstance abnscrs. All the previous economic models of addiction can easily ex-
plain consumption of addictive goods. Agents receive immediate positive utility from 
consnmption, bnt the negative effects are delayed. In some models, this delay is exac-
erbated by self-control problems or nncertainty or underestimation of these negative 
consequences. In my model, the negative effects from consnmption of the addictive 
good is not only delayed, but also nnderestimated. Not a ll the previons models have 
a well-motivated explanation for why agents wonld choose to qnit. In Becker and 
Mmphy, for example, agents will quit only as the resnlt of an exogenons shock to the 
measure of past consnmption. In the model presented in the next chapter, agents 
may qnit when they realize the trne negative consequences. 
The real pnzzle is why a person would resume consnmption of an addictive sub-
stance after deciding to quit. Addiction research in neurobiology suggests that seem-
ingly neutral environments are the main cansc of relapse. A person's physiological 
system learns to predict the onset of addictive substances through environmental cues 
after repeated drug use. Even long after quitting, experiencing environmental cues 
that were once associated with drug usc will in a sense remind the individual 's sys-
tem of past drug usc. This "reminder" manifests itself as craving for the addictive 
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substance. In my model, I allow for an agent's environment. t.o shape her preferences 
in a systematic way suggested by these findings . Every period, the agent is in one 
of two possible environments. Past consumption in a given environment only enters 
into the utility function if the agent is in that environment. Therefore, even though 
the environments may initially be neutral in that they have no direct effect on utility, 
preference can come to depend on environment. 
The main results are driven by the environmentally dependent preferences, sepa-
rability between environments, and multiple steady states. The multiple steady states 
arc possible because of the complementarity between current and past consumption. 
Under this framework , I show how an agent can choose to quit her addiction in one 
environment (e.g., hospital, jail), but not in the other (e.g. , home). Therefore, when 
she is in the first environment, she consumes very little or none of the addictive good, 
but when she is in the other environment, environmental cues trigger craving, and 
she resumes consuming large quantities. 
Chapter 3 presents an empirical analysis of the Becker and Murphy model of ra-
tional addiction using data on grocery store sales of cigarettes. Thus far, Becker and 
Murphy's rational model has been the standard model of addiction in economics. 
There have been a few empirical tests of the rational addiction model t hat pertain 
to a variety of addictive substances and activities, such as cocaine (Grossman and 
Chaloupka, 1998), alcohol (Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan, 1998), casino gam-
bling (Nichols, 1999) and cigarettes (Becker, Grossman and Murphy, 1994; Chaloupka, 
1991; Keeler, Hu, Barnett and Manning, 1993; and Grnber and Koszegi , 1999). 
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T he previous empirical tests of rational addiction that study cigarette addiction 
typically use either state cigarette and tobacco tax receipts or survey data. A seri-
ous problem with using cigarette and tobacco tax receipts to measure consumption 
is that, for most s tates, state-level tobacco taxes arc paid by tobacco distributors, 
rather than tobacco consumers. Therefore, state-paid tobacco taxes more accurately 
reflect distributors' demand for cigarette and tobacco tax stamps, rather than con-
sumer demand for cigarettes. As for survey data, there may be concern that survey 
respondents may deny or downplay their consumption of such goods as cigarettes, 
alcohol, or illegal drugs due to social conformity. 
T he dataset that I usc avoids these da ta problems. The data, compiled by In-
formation Resources Incorporated from grocery store scanner data, describe weekly 
sales in 20 markets that span the states of California, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, 
and Washington. 
The previous tests of the rational addiction model have focused on the model's 
predictions concerning consumption responses to future and past price changes. This 
essay also allows an empirical test of the prediction that the response to an anticipated 
price change differs from the response to an unanticipated price change. According 
to the rational model, if a price change will cause an agent to change his consump-
tion of the addictive good, then if the price change is anticipated, as in the case of 
an announced future tax increase, the agent will change his consumption after t he 
announcement, but before the implementation of the price change. 
I consider the consumption effects of three inst.i t utional changes that occur during 
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the time period 1996 through 1999. The first is the ban on smoking in bars and 
taverns in California as part of the state's comprehensive "Smoke-Free Workplace" 
law. Secondly, as a result of the settlement that the five largest tobacco companies 
signed with 46 states in November 1998, these companies raised wholesale tobacco 
prices by 45 cents per pack, the largest cigarette price increase in history. Lastly, 
in the November 1998 election, California voters approved a 50 cent tax increase on 
cigarettes. 
8 
Chapter 2 A Behavioral Theory of Addiction 
2.1 Introduction 
Consumption of addictive goods has b een studied by researchers in such diverse fields 
as psychology, biochemistry, nem obiology, epidemiology, and sociology. Herrnstein 
and P relec (1992) argue that this broad range of disciplines reflects the complexity 
of the issues involved . Recent. work in economics adds a unique p erspective to the 
study of addiction. 
The ra tional choice model of addiction was first introduced by Stigler and Becker 
(1977) in an attempt. to demonstra te tha t many behavioral phenomena, including ad-
d iction , can be modeled without. the assumption of a change in tastes over t ime. The 
model of rational addiction was further developed by Becker and Murphy (1988) to 
explain how a perfectly ra tional forward looking agent may develop a harmful addic-
tion . Becker and Murphy (B-M) p resen t an infinite horizon continuous time problem 
where u t ili ty dep ends on current consmn ption of addictive and non-addictive goods 
as well as a stock of past. consumption of the addictive good. Agents are aware of the 
negative effect of their current. consumption of a (harmfully) addict ive good on fu ture 
utility via fut.nre craving. T he key to this model lies in t he relaxation of the usual 
assumption of intert.emporal separability. Consumpt ion patterns consistent with ad-
diction result from forward-looking utili ty maximization with stable preferences. T he 
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franwwork incorporates charact.erist ics associated wi t.h addiction such as tolerance, 
reinforcement, and withdrawal, and it offers an explanation for behaviors such as 
bingeing or quitting "cold-tnrkey." 
Orphanides and Zervos (0-Z) extend the B-M framework to an infinite horizon 
discrete time problem in which there is uncertainty about types. The population 
consists of addictive types, who may experience negative side effects as a result of 
past consumption, and non-addictive types, who are not. adversely affected by past 
ronsmnption. In their model, the negative side effects from past consumption are 
irregular. An addictive type may, therefore, believe that he is a non-addictive type 
and begin to consume as a non-addictive type would. By the time the individual 
realizes his true type, he may a lready be addicted. 0-Z refer to these individuals as 
"regretful" addicts~if they had known with certainty that they were addictive types, 
they would have consumed less or none of the addictive good. Their model captures 
the same characteristics of addictive goods as B-M, but it a lso offers an explanation for 
such things as experimentation with addictive substances; the simultaneous existence 
of rasnalnsers, addicts, and non-users; and the role of drug education programs. 
There a re also models of addiction that deviate from t he rational paradigm. Lai b-
son (1999) presents a model of "cue-based ronsnmption," in which agents perfectly 
forecast their preferences, but neutral environments, or cues, ran eventnally affect 
both welfare and behavior. Utility in Laibson's model is qualitatively similar to the 
ntility function nsed in B-M. As in the rational models, past behavior affects em -
rent utility and marginal utility. However, in Laibson's model, past behavior in a 
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certain environment only affects current utility if the agent is currently in that en-
vironment. His model demonstrates how it is possible for an agent to be addicted 
in one environment., but not another. The Laibson framework formalizes a biological 
micro-foundation for why an agent may have significantly different preferences in dif-
ferent environments . In addition to the characteristics of addiction that B-M explain, 
Laibson's model can also expla in short-term impatience with regard to consumption 
of addictive goods. 
Like Laibson, Loewenstein (1999) stresses the importance of environmental cues in 
explaining t he consumption patterns of those who consume addictive goods. Loewen-
stein argues that drug craving falls into the category of "visceral factors," which in-
dudes such other motivational states as hunger, thirst , or sexual a rousal. Visceral 
factors in general , and craving in particular, are defined by a direct, negative impact 
on utility together with the ability to focus attention on alleviating this aversive ef-
fect so that the relative desirability of other goods or actions is severely diminished. 
Loewenstein's visceral factor account of addiction places great weight on environmen-
tal cues because these cues can induce craving. He finds that the utility derived from 
consuming the addictive good decreases over time, while, simultaneously, the craving 
the agent experiences increases in severity if he abstains from consuming the good in 
the presence of the environmental cue. 
This line of economic research may be traced back to Schelling (1978) who, in his 
essay on "Egonomics, or the art of self-management," argues that agents often behave 
as if they are two people one who is "straight" and one who is "wayward." Thaler 
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and Shefrin (1981) explicitly model an agent as having two sets of preferences at any 
given point in time. One set of preferences represents short-run preferences, while 
the oth er represents long-run preferences. In order to maximize long-run preferences, 
an agent may choose to restrict his short-run choice set. For example, in t he case 
of alcohol abuse, an alcoholic may take Antabuse, which will make him severely ill 
if he then consumes alcohol. Their model of self control implies that "people will 
rationally choose to impose constraints on their own behavior." 
O 'Donoghue and Rabin (1999) explicitly model agents as having self-control prob-
lems. They show how self-control problems can affect the consumption of addictive 
goods by comparing agents who have no self-control problems, agents who have self-
control problems but a re not aware of this, and agents who have self-control prob-
lems and are aware of their problems. Unlike t he previously mentioned models, 
O'Donoghue and Rabin's (0-R) model considers both stationary and dynamic pref-
erences as well as finite and infinite horizon s. Gruber and Koszegi (1999) generalize 
the 0-R fram ework from the case of a bina ry consumption decision to continuous 
consumption and include prices so that they can analyze optimal government policy. 
Despite this range of research , there are two p revalent featmes of addiction and 
addicts themselves that these rational addiction models do not capture at all , and 
that the b ehavioral models of Laibson, O'Donoghue and Rabin, and others fail to 
formalize completely. The initial choice to consume an addictive good may be vol-
untary, but, after sus tained drug use, the addict's physiological system is altered 
in such a way that the individual's preferences ch ange (for example, see Leshner, 
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1997 or O 'Brien and 1\IcLellan , 1996). The ra tion al models capture these changes 
simply by the indusion of pas t consumption in the current utility function. In the 
B0ckcr-Mnrphy, Laibson and O 'D onoglme-Ra bin models, the forward-looking agent 
p erfectly foresees the future effects of his current consumption (although agents in 
the 0-R model may not p erfectly predict their own self-control problems) . As in 
the B-M model, individuals in th 0 Orphanides-Zervos m odel know the extent of the 
future effects, should th ey occnr, but t hey do not know when , and even if, they will 
occnr. However , in contrast to all of th ese m odels, addictions are frequently believed 
to result from underestimation of future cravings (sec for example, Loewenstein et 
a l. , 1999 or Loewenstein , 1999). 
The second omitted feature is the pa ttern of quitting and relapse that is frequently 
seen in addicts. It is estimated tha t 50-70% of addicts wh o complete a treatment 
program fail to abstain (i .e., relapse a t least once) within the following year (O'Brien 
and McLellan , 1996). In the Becker-Murphy model, the decision t o quit or to relapse 
can b e explained by the addition to the model of an exogen ous shock tha t directly 
a ffects the m easure of past consumption . However , this ad hoc extension of the model 
is not empirically test able , offers no room for policy ana lysis , and leaves unclear 
the interpreta tion of a shock to the consumption stock variable. Furt hermore, if 
the sh ocks are sufficiently regular , then the model should include t he agen t's beliefs 
ab out the process genera ting these sh ocks. This typ e of chan ge to the m odel could 
significantly change the dynamics and results. 
Alterna tively, the B-M model can explain bingcing cycles, which may also b e 
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interpreted as quitting-relapsing cycles, by introducing two separate consumption 
stock variables which depreciate at different rates. As with the exogenous shock to 
the consumption stock variable, the justification for having two different consumption 
stocks is not made clear. 
The 0-Z model predicts that quitting can occm at most once, at the time that 
the agent realizes he is an addictive type. The 0-R model generates, in the infinite 
horizon case with stationary preferences , agents who may begin an addiction and 
agents who may end an addiction, but these agents do not quit and then relapse. 
Research outside of economics offers insight into the phenomenon. Numerous 
studies have found that the presence of environmental cues that h ave been associ-
ated with past consumption of an addictive good can induce craving, even after the 
addict has quit the substance: "Even after detoxification and long periods of absti-
nence, relapse frequently occurs despite sincere efforts to refrain. People or situations 
previously associated with drug use may provoke a relapse" (O'Brien 1997, p. 66). 
Although Laibson's model can not explain quitting and therefore relapse, it can ex-
plain this important link between environment and behavior that is often observed 
in cases of relapse. 
The model presented in this paper captnres both of the aforementioned features of 
addiction: agents may not perfectly forecast the effect of their cnrrent consumption 
on fntnre utility, and, among those agents who do begin to consume the addictive 
good, some may exhibit consumption behavior consistent with a pattern of quitting 
and relapse. First, the agent knows that cnrrent consumption of an addictive good 
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will decrease fu ture utility and increase fntnre m arginal utility from consumption of 
the addictive good , but sh e does not know the strength of these effects. In particular, 
a fter Sllffk ien t experience cons11ming the addictive good , these effects become more 
severe , b11t the agent d ocs no t fully anticipa te this ch ange. 
Behavior tha t can b e interpreted as a p at tern of q11itt.ing and rclpase is gen era ted 
by b11ild ing on Laibson 's (1999) framework in which environment m ay play a role in 
shaping preferences, together wit h allowing for imperfect foresigh t. t ha t is similar to 
the nncer tainty in Orphanides a nd Zervos (1995). Using this framework, I show how 
an addict m ay choose to q11it h er addiction in one environment, yet being placed in 
an environment in which she h ad frcq11cntly used the addictive s11bst ance may trigger 
such strong craving that the addict will resume consumption of th e addictive good. 
T h e m ispcrception of th e toleran ce function can generate quit ting, while the link 
between environments and preferences can generate relapse. 
T his paper focuses on s11bstan cc addiction . The wealth of informa tion from oth er 
disciplines has given economists a n11mber of insights as to how preferences for ad-
dictive substances m ay b e m odelled. Of course, consump tion of addic tive goods is a 
somewha t anom alous example of consumptiOn behavior. However , i t is easy to see 
how s11ch an an alysis could apply to a wide range of cons11mp tion goods for which 
p references d isplay som e degree of habit formation , a lbeit not nearly as strong as that 
of addictive goods . 
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2.2 Evidence from Psychology and Neurobiology 
The complexity of issnes involved in stndying addiction is revealed not only in the 
nnmber of disciplines that are involved in its research, but also in the variety of 
definitions of addiction (for examples of the wide range of definition, see Pomerleau 
and Pomerlean, 1988). There does appear to be a strong consensus, however, about 
the underlying behavioral mechanisms involved in the addiction process. 
2.2.1 Conditioned Responses 
An organism's physiological system relics on internal equilibrium (Koob and LeMoal, 
1997). Disturbances to stability are mediated by homeostatic mechanisms, mecha-
nisms that work to return the organism to its equilibrium. For example, even though 
the external temperature may fluctuate , one's body maintains a constant internal 
body temperature through adjustments to heart rate and blood pressure. However , 
some disturbances, such as those caused by the administration of an unfamiliar chem-
ical, require more complex strategies. 
Classical conditioning is the experimental study of anticipatory responses. In a 
typical conditioning paradigm, two stimuli are repeatedly paired so that eventually 
one stimulus predicts the second stimulus . Conditioning then allows an organism's 
physiological system to prepare for the second stimulus. Classical conditioning studies 
have revealed that there are two effects of repeated drug administration: the responses 
elicited by the administration of the drng, which are labelled as feedback responses, 
and responses elicited by the anticipation of administration of the drng, labelled 
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feedforward responses (see Siegel et al. , 1988, or Eikelboom and Stuart, 1982). 
In terms of addiction research, the first stimulus is typically an environmental 
"cue." Cues for laboratory animals can include sounds, temperatures, or such visual 
cues as colors. Cues in the addict's world "can inclnde mood states (positive as 
well as negative), specific persons, locations, events or times of year, mild alcohol 
intoxication, interpersonal strife previously soothed by cocaine euphoria, or abuse 
objects (for example, money, white powder, glass pipes , mirrors, syringes, and single-
edged razor blades)" (Gawin, 1991 , p. 1582). 
Homeostatic responses tend to be compensatory. That is, they work to counteract 
the direct effect of the substance in order to restore stability. For example, nicotine 
raises blood sugar. The compensatory response that is generated works to lower blood 
sugar. When the administration of a drng is anticipated, feedforward mechanisms are 
activated, and therefore the compensatory response is operational before the actual 
administration of the drng. If the drug is subsequently administered, then the effects 
of the drug appear to be diminished. This "progressively diminished response to a 
drug over the course of successive administrations defines tolerance" (Siegel et al., 
1988, p. 88). 
The consensus among researchers is that tolerance and withdrawal are both man-
ifestations of the same mechanism. Tolerance manifests itself when the drug is ad-
ministered, and withdrawal occurs when the drng is withheld. Continning with the 
nicotine example, suppose a nicotine addict frequently follows drinking an alcoholic 
beverage by smoking a cigarette. Eventually, the consumption of an alcoholic bev-
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erage signals the physiological system that nicotine will soon follow. If the nicotine 
addict subsequently smokes a cigarette, then by the time nicotine has entered the 
system, the blood sugar level has already decreased. Therefore, the net increase in 
blood sugar from the administration of nicotine is not as large as if the system had 
not anticipated the nicotine. On the other hand, if the addict docs not subsequently 
smoke the cigarette, the decrease in blood sugar will cause the addict to feel hunger 
or irritability, traits often associated with nicotine withdrawal. 
Repeated administration of a drng docs not necessarily imply tolerance. Instead, 
tolerance is environmentally specific. It. results from repeated administration of a 
drug in the presence of environmental cues. Because "overdose" is often simply a 
failure of tolerance, studies of overdose' can shed light on tolerance. In a study by 
Siegel ct al. (1982), rats were given regular and increasing doses of heroin in a specific 
environment. The rats were subsequently given a high dose of heroin in either the 
familiar environment or an unfamiliar environment. Survival rates were significantly 
higher for rats that received the heroin in the familiar environment than for rats 
who were given heroin in an unfamiliar environment. Similarly, in a small study of 
survivors of heroin overdose, the majority stated that the overdose occurred when the 
drug was administered without the usual environmental cues (Siegel, 1984). 
Lastly, consider the experience of U.S. enlisted Army men who served in Vietnam. 
While serving overseas, a large proportion of soldiers, the majority of whom had little 
prior experience with narcotics, became addicted to heroin and/or opium (Robins 
1993). In a study of over 600 men who left Vietnam in September of 1971 , Robins 
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(1974) found that 45% of enlisted men had tried narcotics while in Vietnam. About 
20% of the sample of soldiers reported that they had felt addicted to heroin or opium 
in Vietnam. Despite prior warning of a mandatory urine test at the time of departure, 
11% of enlisted men t ested positive. However , one year after discharge, the relapse 
r ate among the addicted servicemen was only 5%. In contrast, young men who had 
not served in Vietnam who were treated in a Federal Narcotics Hospital during the 
same time p eriod as the Vietnam study had a six month relapse rate of 67%. In 
terms of the conditioning framework, because the addicted servicemen were removed 
from the environment that they had associated with opiate use, and returned to an 
environment with very few past drug cues, it is not surprising that their relapse rate 
is so low. 
The meaning of the term "craving" is less clear. Unlike tolerance and withdrawal 
symptoms which can b e measured by ch anges in observed outcomes such as heart 
rates, chemical levels in the brain, or blood sugar levels in both humans and animals, 
craving is subjective and usu ally measured by human self-reports. For pnrposes of 
this paper , craving is taken to be "a strong desire for the alleviation of unpleasant 
withdrawal symptoms" (Marlatt, 1987, p. 42). 
2.2.2 Perceptions of the Effects of Addictive Substances 
The degree of tolerance and the intensity of withdrawal symptoms vary widely among 
users and substances (Goldstein and Kalant, 1990) . Because effects of substances 
vary widely across substances, it. is not surprising that people h ave misperceptions or 
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judgment biases about those effects. 
For example, when asked their perceptions of the risks associated with heavy 
drinking and drunk driving, those who abstain from drinking alcohol perceive more 
risks than those who drink. (Agostinelli and Miller, 1994). Champion and Bell (1980) 
a lso report an inverse relationship between substance use and perceptions of danger 
of addictive substances in a study in Australia that includes high school and college 
students, nurses, prisoners, probationers, and juvenile delinquents. In a survey of 
college students, Rohsenow (1983) finds that socia l drinkers expect that other people 
will be more strongly affected, for both positive and negative effects, by alcohol than 
they expect themselves to be affected. 
Predicting future, or long term, effects of substance use may be more difficult. 
Loewenstein (1999) argues that craving fa lls into the category of "visceral factors," 
which includes such other motivational states as hunger , thirst , or sexual arousal. He 
claims that people tend to underestimate not only the strength of visceral influences, 
but also their own susceptibility to them. 
Even after negative effects of substance use manifest themselves, users can ignore 
or deny their existence. For example, "as cocaine addiction develops, a transition to 
high-dose long-duration bingeing occurs, in which the intensely pleasurable effects are 
experienced alone, and increasingly apparent negative contingencies go unrecognized" 
(Gawin, 1991, p . 1581). Addicts may not even realize that their consumption may 
b e excessive, presumably due to tolerance. In a study of nurses and high school and 
college students, of respondents who were categorized by the researchers as heavy or 
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excessive substance users, only 33.3% p erceived their own usc to b e h eavy or excessive 
(Champion and Bell, 1980) . 
2 .3 Basic Model 
The first basic featnre of the model is the variable environment. In each p eriod , the 
agent can find himself in one of two environments, environment A or environmen t B . 1 
After observation of the environment, the agent allocates his/her resources b etween 
two goods : c, a non-addictive consumption good, and a, a potentia lly addictive con-
smnption good. Assume that the choice variables c and a are continuous. Let a~ and 
c~ denote consumption of the potentially addictive good and the non-addictive good , 
resp ectively, when the environment a t time t is environment A. Likewise, let af and 
cf den ote consumption of the potentially addictive good and the non-addictive good , 
resp ectively, under environment B. 
P ast consumption of the p otentially addictive good in environment A is summa-
rized by a stock variable xA. Each p eriod in which the environment is A ( Wt = A), 
the compensat ory process evolves and the stock variable is updated according t o 
where a , {3 E (0 , 1) . When the environment IS B (wt B ), this stock variable is 
nne h anged : 
A A 
x t+l = x t 
1 The ma in results are easily extended to n > 2 environments. 
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Past consumption of the potentially addictive good in environment B is summarized 
by a stock variable x 8 which evolves as follows: 
when Wt = B, and 
when Wt =A. 
Initial stocks, x~, x~ are exogenous. As in Loewenstein, et al. (1999), the con-
sumption stocks can be thought of as levels of addiction. When the agent is in 
environment A , the addiction level associated with environment B, x 8 , is dormant: 
the addiction level docs not evolve, and utility is unaffected by x 8 . Likewise, when 
the environment is B, the addiction level associated with environment A is dormant. 
For now, I assume that the probability of the environment is exogenous: 
A with probability f.1, 
B with probability 1 - f.1, 
where f.1, E [0, 1] . 
The second basic feature of the model is the potential misperccption by the in-
dividnal of the underlying physiological changes caused by her consumption of the 
addictive good. The tolerance and withdrawal that an agent may experience is rep-
resented by a "tolerance function" v(a,x) where v(a,x)::; 0 for all a,x, with strict 
inequality if and only if x > 0. The agent misperceives the tolerance function as 
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v(a,x) 
Figure 2.1 : Example of true vs. perceived tolerance function 
v(a, x) where, as with the true tolerance function, v(a, x) ~ 0 for all a, x, with strict 
inequality if and only if x > 0. I assume that given a, v(a, x ) is weakly steeper , and 
more negative than v(a, x) for all x (see Fignre 2.1). After sufficient exp erience with 
the addictive good, that. is, when the addiction level , x, reaches some threshold level, 
x, the agent realizes the t rue tolerance function. I assume tha t this threshold level is 
exogen011s and may be environmen t-specific. 
If xi < xj' the agent believes tha t current and fu ture instantaneous u t ility when 
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Wt = j , j E {A. B} is given by 
U(c[, ai, xi) = u(c:I , ai) + v(ai , x{) 
where u 1 , u 2 ;:::: 0. However, when xi ;:::: :i), the agent learns that his true instantaneous 
utility when Wt = j is given by 
U(C: , ai, x{) = u(c[ , a{)+ v(a{, x{) 
The basic assumptions of the model arc 
1. u ( c, a) is twice continuously differentiable in c and a, and v (a, x) and v( a, x ) 
are twice continuously differentiable in a and x. 
2. u is increasing and strictly concave in c and a; u 1 (c, a) ;:::: 0, u 2 (c, a) 2: 0 and 
uu(c,a) < 0, u22(c, a) < 0, u11 (c,a) +u22(c,a) < 2u12(c, a). 
3. The tolerance functions are negative, with v(a, x) more negative than v(a, x) : 
for all a, X, v(a, x ) ::; v(a, x) ::; 0, with v(a, x ) = 0 iff X= 0 and v(a, X) = 0 iff 
X= 0. 
4. The tolerance functions arc strictly increasing in a and decreasing in x, with 
v(a,x) steeper than v (a ,x) with respect to x: vl(a,x ),vl (a,x) > 0 for a> 0 
and X> 0 and V2(a, x) :S V2 (a , x) :S 0. 
5. 11(a,x) andv(a,x) areconcaveina: v11 (a ,x),::;O,v11 (a,x),::;O. 
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6. a and c are complem ents: u 12 2:: 0, Furthermore, t he cross-partia l derivatives 
between a and X arc p ositive: ?112, V12 2:: 0. 
Incom e, y , and prices a rc assumed constant. Let c b e the uumcr aire and let p be 
the price of the potentially addictive good . Define {X} to b e the indicator function 
tha t takes on the value 1 if the s tatement X is t rue; otherwise, it equals zero. The 
problem faced by an individual with discount rate b and infinite time horizon is: 
(2.1) 
subject to 
d + paf < y 
ci > 0 
as well as the stochastic process on Wt and the stock evolution equa tions: 
X B XB t+l- t 
when Wt = A , and 
X II XA t+ l - t 
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when Wt =B. 
However, the problem that the individual believes that he needs to solve is 
(2 .2) 
subject to the same constraints. 
2.3.1 Discussion 
Addiction Levels and Environments 
Under the assumptions of the model, the budget constraint holds with equality 
(ct = y -pat), and therefore we can focus on the consumption path of the addic-
tive good. This result obtains because, for simplicity, saving and borrowing are not 
a llowed. Therefore, all the intertemporal considerations enter the model through t he 
consumption stock of the addictive good. Unlike the standard consumption problem 
in which the agent builds a stock of assets through savings, the agent in this model 
builds a stock based on past consumption of the addictive good. In the standard 
model , higher capital stock implies higher utility (under the usual assumptions of 
positive marginal utility of consumption and non-satiation). In the model of addic-
tion, utility is decreasing in the consumption stock and, furthermore, there is no free 
disposal of the stock. 
Previous models of addiction and habit formation (Ryder and Heal (1973), Becker 
and Murphy (1988), and Orphanides and Zervos (1995)) have also used a stock vari-
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able to summarize past consumption. However, the present model, which borrows 
from the framework used by La i bson ( 1999) , accounts for the fact that environment 
can play an important role in shaping preferences for addictive goods. Neurobio-
logical evidence presented in Section 2.1 suggests that tolerance and withdrawal do 
not necessarily occur purely as a result of past consumption, as the previous models 
assume. Instead , repeated consumption in a particular environment results in tol-
erance and withdrawal that are specific to that environment . This is captured in 
the present model through the use of environm ent-specific consumption stocks, or 
addiction levels, x~ and xf. 
Note that in this framework, the environment is neutral- the environment has no 
direct impact on utility. Utility and tolerance functions are constant across environ-
ments. Any effects of the environment enter only through t he addiction levels and 
the threshold levels, xA and x8. 
Tolerance Function 
The tolerance function is essential to incorporating withdrawal and tolerance into the 
model. 
In Laibson 's model, the addiction levels , or what he refers to as "the compensatory 
processes," enter into the utility function by directly offsetting consumption of th e 
addictive good. That is, instantaneous utility is of the form: 
f(c) + g(a- .Ax) 
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whereas in my model, the addiction levels enter utility only through the tolerance 
function v(a, x) : 
u(c, a)+ v(a, x) 
Note tha t this model nests Laibson's model. 
Past consumption of the addictive good causes current disutility (v (a , x ) < 0 and 
v( a, x) < 0 iff x > 0). If t he agent abstains in the current p eriod, she exp eriences 
withdrawal symptoms in the form of disu tility. As the level of addiction increases, 
this disutility becomes more pronounced (v2(a, x), v2(a, x) :::; 0). 
However , these aversive effects can be "eased" by current consumption of the good 
( 1!1 (a , X)) 111 (a, X) ~ 0). Furthermore, as the stock increases, the appeal of the good as 
a m ediator of craving increases, as represented by the positive cross partial derivative 
(v12 , v12 ~ 0). In other words, preferences display what Becker and Murphy refer to 
as "adjacent complementarity" 2 , as in the "rational" models of addiction. 
Las tly, note how tolerance and withdrawal operate through the sam e mechanism: 
if the agent chooses to consume the addictive good, the net utility derived from a 
fixed close of the addictive good is diminished by past consumpt ion: for all feasible 
c, a u(c, a) > u(c, a)+ v(a, x) > u(c, a)+ v(a, x') where 0 < x < x'. 
In their paper , O 'Donoghue and Rabin discuss two characteristics of addictive 
goods: they are habit-forming, and they involve "internalities ." Both these charac-
t eristics arc represented by the tolerance function. 
2 T he term "adjacent complementarity" appears to have been coined by Ryder and Heal (1973) 
and referred to complementari ty between consumption on adjacent dates, rather than consump-
tion on distant dates. As Becker and Murphy use it, "adjacent complementarity" simply refers to 
com plementarity between current consumption and the s tock of past consumption. 
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Current consumption of a habit forming good will increase future marginal utility 
of consumption. In terms of my model, this is represented by the assumption that 
the cross partial derivative between the stock variable and current consumption is 
strictly positive. A good has internalities if current consumption affects the future 
level of instantaneous utility from consumption of the good. For example, tolerance 
is a negative internality. That is, current consumption decreases the future u t ility 
level from consumption . The assumptions on the toleran ce function imply that the 
good in question has negative internalities. 
Laibson 's model implicitly assumes that the addictive good in question is one 
that is habit forming and has negative internalities. In the present model, these 
two facets of the addictive good can be separated , even though this feature is not 
taken advantage of in this paper. In order to generalize the model to goods that a re 
not necessarily harmfully addictive substances, this sort of separability is necessary. 
There are goods that may be habit forming, but have positive internalities (exercise, 
for example). Alternatively, there are goods that may h ave negative internalities, but 
are not habit forming (overeating at a meal, for example) . 
Misperception of Tolerance Function 
The assumptions on the t he rela tionship b etween the true tolerance function and 
the misperceived tolerance function imply that the agent underestimates the negative 
consequences from current consumption . Of course, there are individuals who mis-
perceive the future effects of current consumption in the opposite direction. That is , 
they overestimate the future effects. Recall that the studies of Agostinelli and Miller 
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(1994) and Champion and Bell (1980) find an inverse relationship b etween substance 
or akoholuse and perceived risk of using addictive substances. For this paper , I focus 
only on agents who underestimate the future consequences from using addictive sub-
stances, in part because those who overestimate the effects are very unlikely to become 
addicts. However , a generalization of the model to include consumption of goods that 
are not necessarily harmfully addictive substances might want to incorporate those 
who overestimate the future effects of consumption. 
One interpretation of the misperception of the true tolerance function is as fol-
lows: the function v(a,x) is approxima ted by v (a ,x), given a, when X is close to Xo. 
For example, v (a , x) may be the linear Taylor approximation to v(a, x), as in Figure 
1. While the agent has little experience at consuming the addictive product, the 
tolerance and withdrawal symptoms that result from p as t consumption are rela tively 
minor. However , the agent suffers from projection bias3- she underestima tes changes 
in future utility from the present. She assumes that the process that governs the 
negative side effects from consumption of the addictive good will continue into the 
future as it has in the past. She does not realize that, after sufficient consumption 
of the addictive good , changes in her physiological system s cause tolerance and with-
drawal symptoms to increase dramatically. Under this interpretation, the threshold 
level can b e thought of as the point at which the true tolerance function v(a, x) and 
the perceived tolerance function v( a, X) begin to diverge. 
An a lternative interpretation involves a heterogeneous population of agents. Sup-
pose the population consists of two groups: one group for whom v(a, x) is the true 
3For further discussion on projection bias, see Loewenstein, et a l. (1997). 
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tolerance fnnction, and another gronp for whom v(a, x) is the t rue toleran ce fnnction. 
The popnla tion of interest in this pap er are those for whom v(a, x) is the trne toler-
ance function, bnt they initially believe tha t they are of the group for whom v( a, x) 
is t he trne tolerance func tion. Initia lly these agents b elieve with probabili ty one that 
their tolerance function is v( a , x ). After sufficient consumpt ion of the addictive good -
that is, once x > x, the agent upda t es her beliefs and b elieves with probability one 
tha t her t olerance function is given by v (a, x ). 
In this fram ework, regardless of the interpretation , the agent 's "learning" of the 
t rue tolerance function is very simple-the agen t is comp letely unaware of the t rue 
tolerance func tion b efore his addiction level reaches the threshold level, after which 
he perfectly foresees the fut ure effects of current consumption. In Section 5, I consider 
two alterna tive frameworks in which the agent slowly learns, or adjusts to , the t rne 
tolerance function. 
Addiction 
Although there are numerous defini t ion s of addiction (for an overview , see P om erleau 
and P om erleau , 1988), most agree tha t addic tion is characterized by prolonged com-
pulsive use, tolerance, and physical and/ or psychic dep endence. In terms of t he mod el , 
it seem s tha t a reasonable baseline is the consumption levels and consumption stock 
of a hyp othe tical individnal who does not exp erience tolerance and dependence, an 
individual for whom inst antaneons ntility is simply u(c, a) ra ther th an u(c, a) +v(a, x) . 
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Assume then , that an agent 's consumption is compulsive if and only if 
wh ere aN A is the optimal con sumption of the hypothetical individual: 
An individual is "addicted " if and only if his addiction level is high er than the baseline 
defined by aN A; that is, if and only if 
t - 1 
Xt > Xt(aNA) = C\/Xo + 2..::: eti{3aNA 
i = O 
Susceptibility to Addiction 
Clearly, individuals are not homogeneous in their susceptibility to addiction. The 
probability that an individual becomes addicted is influenced by a hos t of exogenous 
factors that may be genetic, social, or environmental. Many of these factors can be 
captured in the model. 
Consider the initial addiction levels , x~, x~ . These can reflect any genetic ten-
dcncy toward addiction. In the extrem e case of children who are born addicted to a 
substance, they can reflect the degree to which the child is addicted at birth. Alterna-
tively, suppose the decision-making process regarding addictive substan ces begins not 
a t birth, but later in life , su ch as adolescence. In this case, the initial addiction lev-
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els can represent any first-hand or second-hand experience with addictive substances 
prior to the adolescent years. In this latter example, it may be plausible that the ini-
tial addiction levels may vary across environments; however, different interpretations 
may suggest otherwise. Therefore, I assume xt = x~. 
An individual's genetic tendency toward addiction may also be reflected in his 
true tolerance function. For example, the second derivative of the tolerance function 
may increase in magnitude as genetic tendency toward addiction increases. Or the 
appeal of the addictive substance as a m ediator of craving (the cross partial derivative 
of v between a and x) may increase with genetic tendency. 
The threshold levels, £A , x8, or the degree of misperception of the true tolerance 
function may be in part determined by the individual's personality. As discussed 
above, the misperception of the true effects of addictive substances may be due to 
projection bias. The threshold levels represent the point at which the agent realizes 
the true tolerance function. 
I allow the threshold levels, £A, x8 , to capture any difference in susceptibility 
across environments. For example, events that elicit dysphoric or euphoric states may 
sensitize an individual to the direct effects of addictive substances (Pomerleau and 
Pomerleau, 1988). In certain environments, it may take an agent longer to realize the 
degree of his substance abuse than in others. Alternatively, this phenomenon could 
be captured by having the perceived tolerance function vary across environments. 
Initially, I assume that the thresholds vary, but the perceived tolerance functions do 
not. 
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2.4 Optimal Behavior and Dynamics 
2 .4. 1 S ingle Environme nt M o d e l 
To facilitate the analysis, I begin by analyzing optimal b ehavior in the world in 
which there is only one possible environment. Before I characterize the optimal p olicy 
function for the single environment (SE) model , con sider the first order conditions in 
order to gain an understanding of optimal b ehavior. 
Initially, the agent b elieves that she mnst solve: 
00 
V5E(xo) = max Eo~ 8t [u(y- pat, at)+ v(at, xt)] 
{a, ,ct} ~o t= O 
(2.3) 
where xo is given. Assnming an interior solution, the first order condition to the 
problem in Eqnation (2.3) is 
00 
u2(y- pat, at)+ V1 (at, Xt) = pul (y- pat, at) + ~ Diai- l {3v2(at+i, Xt+i ) (2 .4) 
i = l 
Each period, the individual weighs the b enefit from consnming the addictive good, 
current marginal n tility, against what Becker and Murphy call the full price of the 
addictive good. The full price includes the price of the addictive good, as well as 
the marginal effects of current consumption on fntnre utility. The agent realizes that 
current consumption has a d etrimental effect on fu ture utility. However , when x < x 
the agent does not realize the extent of these effects. 
Note that, even though the agent may know the true utility level at time t, the 
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agent docs not necessarily know the true marginal utility that he will experience as 
a result of continued consumption at time t. In making the consumption decision 
at time t , the agent is unaware of the true m arginal effect of cnrrent consnmpt ion 
on current u tility: the agent's first order condition h as u2(y -pat , at) + v1 (at , Xt) 
rather than u2(y --pat, at)+ v1 (at, Xt) on the left-hand side. D ep ending on the form of 
v(at, Xt), the agent could overestimate, or even underestimate, the current marginal 
utility from current consumption. 4 
When x > x, the agent realizes the true tolerance function, and the problem that 
the individual must now solve is 
00 
V 5 E(xr) = max Eo L ot [u(ct, at)+ v(at, xt) ] 
{at ,Ct }~ -r t =T 
(2.5) 
where T denotes the first period after the change m the tolerance func tion. The 
appropriate first order condition is: 
00 
u2(Y- pat , at)+ vl(at, xt) = pul(Y- pat, at) + L oia.i-l {3v2 (at+i, Xt+i) 
i=l 
The individual 's maximization problems can be recast as s tationary dy namic pro-
gramming problems. While x < x, the Bellman equat ion is: 
V 5 E(x)= max [u(y - pa,a)+v(a, x)+oV5 E(a.x+{3a)] 
aE[O,;J 
(2.6) 
4 Recall that, even though there are assumptions on the relationship b etween v2 and v2, there a re 
no restrictions on the relationship between v 1 and v1 . 
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After the agent realizes the true tolerance function, the Bellman eqnation is given by: 
V 5 E(x) = max [u(y - pa, a)+ v(a, x) + 8V5 E(ax + ,Ba)] (2.7) 
aE (O,; J 
The assumptions on utility and the Theorem of the Maximum ensure the existence, 
uniqneness, and differentiability of ifsE(x) and V 5 E(x), as well as the existen ce of 
non-empty upper semi-continuous policy correspondences 
¢(x) [x'IV5 E(x) = u(y- ~(x' - ax), ~(x'- ax))+ v(~(x'- ax),x) + 8V5 E(x') ] 
¢(x) [x ' IV5 E(x) = u(y- ~(x' - ax), ~(x'- ax))+ v(~(x'- ax), x) + 8V5 E(x') ] 
Standard dynamic programming techniqnes can not be used to ch aracterize if;(x) 
and ¢(x) for two reasons. First, ntili ty is not assnmecl to be strictly concave in c, a, 
and x. Second, utility is decreasing in the stock variable, in contrast to the standard 
production or consumpt ion dynamic programming problems. Furthermore, th ere is 
no free disposal of the stock. 
Both if;( x) and ¢( x), the optimal stock evolutions , can be characterized by the 
following proposition, which draws heavily from Orphanides and Zervos, 1994: 
Proposition 1 For an agent with value function given by Equation (2.6} or (2. 7), 
(i) every optimal path is a monotonic sequence; (ii) any optimal path converges to a 
steady state; and (iii} there exists exactly one critical level between any two consecutive 
stable steady states. 
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Monotonicity follows from the fact that timet marginal utility with respect to time 
t stock is increasing in time t + 1 s tock. Convergence to a s teady state then follows 
because the optimal path is a bounded monotonic sequence. The critical value may 
or m ay not be an unstable steady s tate. When the critical value is not an unstable 
steady state, the possibility of multiple optimal paths a rises. Such a critical value 
exists b ecause of the complementarity between current consumption of the addictive 
good and the stock of past consumption. All proofs arc in the appendix. 
Suppose the optimal paths associated with equations 2.6 and 2. 7 have one crit ical 
value (x* and x*, respectively) between two stable steady states, as pictured in Figure 
2.25 . The optimal consumption correspondence for the misperceived maximization 
problem, a*(x) = *(;f;(x) -ax), is represented by the medium bold correspondence, 
and a*(x) = *(¢>(x) -ax), the consumption policy for the agent 's true problem, is 
represented by the heavy bold correspondence. The steady states that correspond 
to Equation (2.6) a re given by i and i, while the steady states that correspond to 
Equation (2.7) a re ;f and x. For ease of exposition, denote the lower steady states i 
and ;!2 as the no-addiction steady states, and the higher steady states as t he addiction 
steady states. 
When the critical value associated with Equation (2.6) is less than the critical 
level associated with equation 2.7 (x* < x*), as in this example , whether the agent 
ultimately enters a state of addiction depends on the initia l addiction level, x 0 , and the 
51n this example, u( c, a) = ln c + ln a , v( a, x) = 5.6ax - 6x and v( a , x) = 5.6ax - 5.6x. I assume 
y = p = 1, a = 0.5, {3 = 1 and 8 = 0.9. T he policy correspondence associated with the t rue tolerance 
function , a*(:r) , has two stable steady states .l = 0.23 and x = 1.79 and a cri tical value x* = 0.94. 
The policy correspondence associated with the perceived tolerance function , a* (x ) , has two stable 
s teady states ;I = 0.26 and ?f = 1.81 and a critical valuE' x* = 0.83 
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threshold, x. If x 0 < x* < x* , the agent will never b ecom e addicted , regardless of the 
threshold. The optimal stock converges toward ;I or ;f d ep ending on the relationship 
b etween Xo and X. On the other hand, Xo > x* > x* implies th a t the optimal stock 
will converge toward ?f or x, b oth of which yield h armful addiction s. 
If x* < Xo < x*' the agent will b ecome addicted if and only if X> x*. Initially, the 
agent 's consumption s tock will b egin to approach the higher steady state ?f (assum ing 
tha t x > x0 ). However , b efore this steady sta te is reached , the threshold level x will 
b e reach ed . At x, t he agent will realize the t rue toler ance function, and his opt imal 
p a th will shift. If x > x*, then the agent will cont inue consuming the addictive good 
and his addictive level will m ono tonically approach t he steady st a te labelled as x. On 
the other hand, if x < x*, then the agent 's consumption of the addictive good will 
decrease and his stock will converge to the steady s ta te lab elled by ;f. Therefore, if 
x > x* the individua l will m ove toward a state of addiction , wh ereas, if x < x*, the 
individual will essentia lly "quit." In this example, a t the addiction steady state, the 
agent 's inst antaneous u t ility every p eriod is -2.80 wh ereas ins tantaneous u tility at 
t he no-addiction s teady state is -2.23. 
The case when x* < Xo < x* and X > x* illustra tes how it is possible for the 
agent 's consumption of the addictive good to converge to the st eady state associated 
with the state of addiction , although had he known the t rue tolerance function , his 
consumption would never had progressed as far . These addicts are similar to th e 
"regretful addicts" of Orphanides and Zervos ( 1995). 
The agent for whom x* < Xo < x* and X < x* "experiments" with the addictive 
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good, but does not ultimately b ecom e addicted. When he is s till naive to the true 
effects of the addictive good, he b egins to consume the addictive good. When he then 
learns of the true effects of his past consumption, he decreases h is consumption. 
This example also illustrates that the agent's lifetime utility is weakly decreasing in 
the threshold level x. The earlier t hat the agent realizes the trne toler ance function, 
the better off the agent is m ade, because he can then maximize his trne lifetime 
consumption problem, rather than the incorrect, perceived problem. 
Notice that in the single environment model, as in the 0-Z model, agents can quit 
their addiction at most once, with no relapse, as illustrated by t he previous case. 
2.4.2 Dual Environment Model 
Now consider the problem given by Equations (2. 1) and (2.2). When x~ < xA and 
xf < x8 , the first order conditions for the solution to the problem given by Equation 
(2.2) are 
00 
u2(y - pat, at)+ v1 (at, x t) = pu1 (y - pat, at)+ L ~-tb'ai-l ,Bv2(at+i' xt+i) (2.8) 
i=l 
when the environment is A, and 
i= l 
(2.9) 
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when the environment is B. After the agent realizes the true tolerance function, the 
first order conditions are 
00 
u2(y-pa:,a:) +vl(a:,x:) =pu1(y-pa:,a:) + Lf.LOiai- lj)v2(a:+i,x:+i) (2. 10) 
i = l 
when the environment is A, and 
00 
u2(y- paf, af) + vl(af, xf) = pul(Y- paf, af) + L (1- f.L) 8iai-lj)v2(a~i' xf+J 
i=l 
(2.11) 
when the environment is B. 
Once the environment is revealed , the agent compares marginal utility of consump-
tion with the full price of consumption, as before. However , in the dual environment 
(DE) model, the full price of consumption is less than in the SE model. Futnre con-
siderations are further discounted because current consumption will not affect every 
future period. Suppose that the environment is A at time t. Current consumption 
is only relevant in the future periods in which the environment is also A. Therefore, 
marginal utility at time t+-r with respect to timet consumption, a 7 - 1jJv2 (a:+n x:+7 ), 
is also discounted by the probability that the environment will be A at timet+ T. 
The corresponding Bellman equation to Equation (2.2) is: 
max f.L [u(y- paA ,aA) + v(aA,xA) + 8V(axA + j)aA,x8 ) ] (2.12) 
aA,aB 
+ (1 - f.L) [u(y - pa8 , a 8 ) + v(a8 , x 8 ) + 8V(xA, ax 8 + j)a8 )] 
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and the Bellman equation corresponding to the true problem, given by Equation (2.1) , 
is: 
Notice that these value functions reflect the agent's welfare before the realization 
of the environment. Again, the assumptions on utility, together with the Theorem of 
the Maximum, ensure that V(xA , x 8 ) and V(xA, x 8 ) exist and are unique. 
These value functions can be expressed in terms of the single environment value 
flmctions. 
Proposition 2 
and 
where V5 E(.Tib = 0 and V 5E(xlb = 0 are the solutions to Equations (2.6} and (2. 7}, 
respectively, given discount rate ~. 
The intuition b ehind the proposition is sketched ou t here. The proof, which 
closely follows the same line of reasoning as Proposition 3 of Laibson (1999) , is in 
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the appendix. Proposition 2 relies on the separability of utility with respect to the 
environment-specific addiction levels. That is, when the environment is A (or B ), the 
addictive level associated with environment B (or A) is not updated and does not 
affect current utility. 
The proposition reflects the intuition derived from the first-order conditions re-
garding discounting of future periods. Any given future period is discounted not only 
by the rate of time preference, but also by the probability that current consumption 
will not have an effect on that period. In essence, l -o~T-1-L) < o is the disconnt rate 
between the cnrrent period and the next period in which the environment is A. Like-
wise, 6i~~~) < o is the disconnt rate between the current period and the next p eriod 
in which the environment is B. 
The optimal policy correspondences , conditional on the environment, can then be 
written as fnnctions of the relevant addiction level only. The optimal consnmption 
policy correspondences associated with the fnnctional equation given by Equation 
(2.12) when the environment is A or B , respectively, are: 
;{;A (x) { x'IV5 E(x l
1 
_ 0~~ _ p,)) = u(y- ~(x'- ax), ~(x'- ax))+ v(~(x'- ax) ,x) 
+ 1-L 1/SE (x'l op, ) } 
1-o(l-p,) 1-o(l-p,) 
{ x'IV
5 E(xlo(l- p,)) = u(y - p_(x' - ax), ~(x'- ax))+ v( ~(x' - ax), x) 
1 - op, (3 (3 (3 
+ 1 - 1-L V s E ( x'l 8 ( 1 - 1-L) ) } 
l-op, l -op, 
and the optimal policy correspondences associated with eqnation (2.13), when the 
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environment is A or B, are: 
'1/JA(x) 
Because the dual environment value fnnctions arc essentially linear combinations of 
the single environment valne functions (with modified disconnt rates), we can also 
characterize these optimal stock evolutions as in proposition 1. 
Proposition 3 The optimal stock evolutions associated with the Bellman Equations 
given by Equations (2.12) and (2.13}, ;jA(x), ;j8 (x) ,'ljJA(x) and '1jJ 8 (x) , can each be 
characterized as follows: (i) every optimal path is a monotonic sequence; (ii) any 
optimal path converges to a steady state; and (iii) there exists exactly one critical 
level between any two consecutive stable steady states. 
Using an example where the optimal consmnption path has two steady stable 
states, it is easy to see how it is possible for an agent's consnmption to converge to 
the addictive state in one state of the world, but not in the other. 
Consider the example illnstratcd in Figure 2.3. 6 As in theSE l'vlodel example, the 
optimal consumption correspondences for Eqnation (2.12), aA*(x) = ~(;[A(x)- ax), 
6u(c, a) = In c+ In a, v(a , x) = 5.6ax- 6x and v (a , x) = 5.6ax- 5.6x , y = p = 1, a = 0.5, {3 = 1, 
8 = 0.95 and f1 = 0.5. aA* (x) and a8 *(x) each have two stable steady states .I= 0.23 and x = 1.79 
and a critical value x* = 0.94. aM(x) and a 8 *(x) each have two stable steady states i = 0.26 and 
~ = 1.81 and a critical value x* = 0.83. 
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Figure 2.3: Dual environment example. The top panel represents Environment A and 
the hot tom panel represeats Environment B. 
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and a8*(x) = ~(;f8 (x)- ax) are represented by the m edium bold corresponden ce in 
their resp ective figures, and aA*(x) = ~('lj;A(x) -ax) and a8 *(x) = b('l/J8 (x)- ax), 
the consumption policies for Equation (2. 13) , arc represented by the heavy bold 
correspondence. 
Assume that the threshold level in environment B , x8 , is less than the threshold 
level in environment A, XA. In p articular , suppose that x* < x 8 < x* whereas 
x* < x* < xA, as illustrated in the Figure 2.3 above. In this case, once the addictive 
level that is activated in environment A reaches the threshold level, xA, the agent will 
continue consuming the addictive good, and the addiction level will converge to the 
higher steady state xA. On the other h and, when the agent realizes the trne tolerance 
function in environment B, the agent will essentially quit her addiction in this state 
of the world. 
In this example, there a re four possible outcomes. One outcome is low consump-
tion of the addictive good, regardless of the environment, which corresponds to the 
no-addiction steady state in the SE model. Another outcom e is high consumption 
of the addictive good, regardless of the state of the world , which corresponds to the 
addiction steady st a t e in the SE Model. The last two outcomes involve high con-
sumption of the addictive good in on e st ate of the world, but not the other. 
The two outcomes that result in addiction in one environment but not the other 
are the outcom es that can not occur in the models such as those of B-M and 0-Z, 
but they arc essential to capturing the pattern of quitting and relapsing that is so 
prevalent. The agent behaves as if she has quit her addiction in Environment B 
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(a rehabilitation program, for example), but once she returns to Environment A (a 
neighborhood where she frequently consnmed the addictive good), she continues to 
consume. Notice that there are other interpretations of these ontcomes. For example, 
consider binge behavior. "Bingeing" is characterized by periods of high consnmption 
alternating with periods of abstinence. Cocaine addiction is characterized by binge 
behavior (see for example, Gawin, 1991). It is not uncommon for cocaine addicts to 
fnnction normally throughout the working day or week, and then to consume high 
doses of cocaine after working hours or on weekends. In terms of the model, in the 
working or office environment, the agent is at the lower of the two steady states, 
the one associated with no addiction. In the after-hours or weekend environment, 
however, the agent is at the addiction steady state. 
These ontcomes that correspond to high consnmption m one environment bnt 
not the other demonstrate how environment can come to have a very real impact on 
behavior even thongh utility and all exogenons variables, other than threshold levels, 
are constant across environments. Discovery of the true consequences of snbstance 
nse early on implies that it is optimal or "rational" for the agent to qnit nsing the 
snbstance, and therefore, consnme very little, or none, of the snbstance. In the other 
environment, realization of the true conseqnences when it is "too late" implies that 
the optimal or "rational" consumption path for the agent leads to addiction. However, 
notice that because preferences are constant across environments, if preferences are 
snch that the agent chooses to qnit in one environment, then if consnmption in the 
other environment converges to the addiction steady state, the agent "regrets" this 
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addiction. If the agent had known her true preferen ces, she would be at the lower 
steady s ta t e regardless of environment, where utili ty is higher than at the addiction 
steady s ta te . 
One interpretation of th ese outcomes might b e t h a t t he agent chooses to quit in 
one environment, but , in the other environment , h e chooses to continue his addiction . 
This interpretation seems contrary to observation of ad dicts who seek trea tm ent . 
Apparently, they would like to qui t regardless of environment. A m ore realistic inter-
pretation of the b eh avior generated by the m odel is t ha t the agent chooses to qui t in 
one environment , but finds it too pa inful to quit in t he other. However , if possible, 
he would seek t o avoid the "addiction" environment, because his u t ility is higher in 
the environment in which he has quit . For example, m any recovery programs advo-
cate elimina ting the "addiction" environment altogther , if possible (Frawley, 1988). 
Although the environment is exogenously determined in t his model, an extension to 
allow for endogenous d eterminat ion of t he m odel could predict such b ehavior. 
T he agent in this model essentia lly b eh aves as if h e has two p ersonalities. 7 One 
p ersonality corresponds to environment A, while the other corresp onds to environ-
ment B. The consumption decisions that one p erson ality makes do not affect th e 
other , and therefore each personality has u t ility tha t is separ at e and indep endent of 
the other . If the agent 's b eh avior approaches the outcome where his consumption 
of the addictive good is high in one environment but low in t he other , then his two 
7T h c dual person ality that I describe here differs from the typical "divided self" in the literature 
where agents with self control problems are modelled as having multiple selves. One (or more) 
selves are myopic, and one (or more) selves a rc more forward looking. In t his model, bo th selves a re 
forward looking, but uncon cerned with the u tili ty of t he other. See, for exam ple, Winston (1980), 
T haler and Shefrin (1981) for applications to addiction. 
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personalities can be interpreted as one that is operational when craving strikes, and 
another that is operational at all other times. 
2.5 Learning and Tolerance 
2 .5. 1 G radual Learning 
As pointed out in Section 3.1 of this chapter , the agent's assumed process of learning 
the trne tolerance function is somewhat simplistic. Suppose instead that the agent 
gradually learns the trne tolerance function, v (a, x). As an additional modification to 
the original model, assume that the perceived tolerance function is not constant across 
environments. For example, the functional form may b e constant across environments, 
but the parameters are not. 
The agent initially b elieves that the tolerance function in environment j is 1J]0 (a, x ), 
where the value 1/J0 (a, Xb) = vJ (a , xb) . 
Every p eriod in which the environment is j, the agent experiences the trne toler-
ance or craving associated with his addiction level and updates his perceived tolerance 
function associated with environment j in such a way that the p erceived tolerance 
function and the trne tolerance function are equal for all previously realized (a, x) 
pairs. That is, 
vjt (a , x) = v(a, x) 
for all (a ,x) = (ai,x{) , Vi ::; t such that w i = j. 
Las tly, assume that 1J]t(a , x) satisfy all the assumptions on v. Figure 2.4 provides 
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Figure 2.4: An example of gradual learning of the tolerance function 
an example in which there is only one environment, and a 1 = a 2 = a3 . 
Note that under this sort of learning, in each period, the agent behaves as if her 
p erceived tolerance function at that time is the true tolerance function. At each time 
t, the agent believes that his lifetime utility maximization problem is: 
00 
max EtL 
{ af ,afl ,cAt ,ctB } oo 
't = t i= t 
(2.14) 
Therefore, the agent's problem at time t can be written as a stationary Bellman 
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equation: 
max f-1, [u(y- paA' a A) + VAt(aA ' XA) + ovt( axA + (3aA ' x 8 )] (2.15) 
aA,aB 
+ (1- f.-t) [u(y- pa8 ) a8 ) + v8 t(a8 ' x 8 ) + ovt(xA ) ax8 + (3a8 )] 
and the agent 's behavior every period is qualitatively similar to that of the agent 
with th e simple learning process u sed in the bulk of this paper. That is, the Theorem 
of the Maximum together with the assumptions on utility guarantee the existence 
and uniqueness of vt(xA) x 8 ). As before, because utility is separable with respect to 
environments, the value function can be written as the weighted sum of two separate, 
environment-specific value functions: 
Proposition 4 
where WJt(xlb = 0 is the solution to 
(2. 16) 
for j =A, B. 
Given the environment-specific value functions, wAt(x) and W 8 t(x), we can again 
characterize the optimal policy correspondence with t he following Proposition: 
Proposition 5 The optimal stock evolutions associated with the Bellman Equations 
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gwen by Equations ( 2. 16), can each be characterized as follows: (i) every optimal 
path is a monotonic sequence; (ii) any optimal path converges to a steady state; and 
(iii) there exists exactly one critical level between any two consecutive stable steady 
states. 
In this setting, depending on the factors that determine the cri tical values, the 
agent may choose to quit (or relapse) in any period, not simply in the one p eriod in 
which the threshold is reach ed , as in the simple learning case. Therefore, even though 
the agent's one-period behavior m ay b e the same as in the simple learning case, her 
dynamic behavior m ay be substantially richer. 
As a simple example in the single environment setting, consider Figure 2.5, in 
which the tolerance function takes the func tional form v(a, x) = -!xX + laxax. Ad-
ditionally, assume that the agent knows the functional form, but does n ot know lx or 
lax · In p articular, suppose the true tolerance function is v(a, x) = - 6x + 5.6ax but 
the agent 's initial perceived tolerance function is v0 (a , x ) = -5.5x + 5.5ax. Suppose 
x0 = 0.85. Given the agent's perceived tolerance function, his optimal consumption 
is ao = 0.72 , which implies x 1 = 1.14. The agent observes the realized valu e of the 
actual tolerance function, and upda tes his perceived toler ance function accordingly. 
Suppose v1 (a , x) = -5.93x + 5.5ax. Then his optimal consumption is a 1 = 0.80. At 
this point, after observing two realizations of the true toleran ce process, the agent ex-
actly identifies both parameters of the true tolerance function, and follows the optimal 
con sumption path that results from the true problem. 
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2.5.2 A More Complete Model of Learning and Beliefs 
As m entioned above, under this sort of learning, the agent b ehaves in each period 
as if her p erceived tolerance function at that time is the true tolerance function . A 
rich er m odel would include agents who realize tha t their p erceived tolerance function 
is simply a belief about the true tolerance function and who know how their beliefs 
will b e updated in the future. 
Consider a more gen era l model of learning, in which agents upda t e their percep-
tions of the true toler ance func tion. Suppose that the agent knows the true function al 
form of the tolerance function , but does not know all the p aram et ers of the true tal-
erance function. Let 1 denot e the vector of unknown parameters, and write the t rue 
t olerance function as v (a, x, 1). As b efore, assume tha t the p erceived tolerance func-
t ion varies across environments. In environment j , the agent h as some initial belief 
on 1, denoted by ::Y6, and upda t es ::Y{ according to some function g that is assumed to 
b e twice continuously differentiable in b oth its a rguments 
- j (-j J) lt+ l = g It , I 
The updated b eliefs depend not only on last period 's b eliefs, bnt also on any knowl-
ed ge having to do with the trne p aram et er set . For exam ple , a t time t in environment 
j, the agent knows the val11e of v (a{, x{ , 1), and 11ses this information to 11 pdate her 
b eliefs. 
At time t , if the environment is A, the agent's belief ::Y/! d ocs n ot evolve: ::Yf'!t. 1 = ::Yt
8
. 
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Likewise, if the environment is B, the agent's b elief -;y~ does not evolve. The mini-
mum number of periods in environment j for the agent to realize the true tolerance 
function is eqnal to the number of free parameters, assuming that he observes the 
value v(ai, x{, 1'j) at timet. The time it takes for an agent to realize the true toler-
ance fnnction is increasing in the degree of persistence of past beliefs. The perceived 
tolerance function is also written as a function of t he perceived parameters: v(a, x, -;::y). 
As an example, assume as before that the tolerance function is linear in a and 
x. That is, suppose v(a, x, 1') = 1'axax- "fxX. Now suppose that 1'ax is known to the 
agent, bnt 1'x is not . The agent has an initial belief on 1' in environment A , denoted 
as -;::yt . Suppose that the agent's initia l beliefs have some degree of persistence and 
every period in which he is in environmen t A, he updates his belief on 1' according to 
this simple updating function: 
-A - A ( ) 1't+l = P1't + 1 - p 1' 
In this case, if p = 1, the agent never updates his belief. He is cons tantly surprised 
by his realized utility. If p = 0, the agent updates his beliefs r ight away, and realizes 
the true tolerance function after the first period. 
The functiona l equation for the genera l problem is given by 
~a~ ,U [u(y- paA, aA) + V (aA, XA, -;::yA ) + 8V(axA + {3aA, x 8 , g (-;::y A, 1') , -;y 13 )] 
a ,a 
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As before, the separability of utility with respect. to the addiction levels as well 
the beliefs about. the trnc tolerance fnnction allows the valne function to b e written 
as the snm of two environment-sp ecific valne functions . 
Proposition 6 
f.L A - A - 6 f.L 1 - f.L B - B - 6 ( 1 - f.L) 
V(xA,xB ,::vA,;::;B )= W( x "'16 )+ W (x "' 16- ) 
I I 1 - 6(1 - f.L) ' I = 1 - 6(1 - f.L) 1 - 6f.L ' I - 1 - 6f.L 
where W(x, :::YI6 = ~) is the solution to 
vV(x, :::Y) =max [u(y- pa, a)+ v (a , x , :::Y) + ~W(ax + f3a, g (:::Y, !))] 
a 
Once again, the assumptions on utility and the function g(-) and the Theorem of 
the fviaximum en sure the exist ence, uniqueness, and differentiability of W (x , :::Y), as 
well as the existence of a non-empty upper semi-continuous policy correspondences: 
Unfortunately, without. additional restrictions on the utility or tolerance functions, 
the optimal policy correspondences ), A ( x), ), 8 ( x ) can not. be fnrt.hcr characterized. 
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2.6 Direct ions for Future Research 
Clearly, there are many interesting extensions and applications of the model. A few 
are described below. 
2 .6 .1 Spillover in Addiction Lev e ls 
In general, tolerance is environment-specific, but there may be som e spillover of tol-
erance to other environments. For example, in the overdose s tudies of Siegel et al. 
(1982), exp erienced rats who were injected with heroin in an unfamiliar environment 
h ad a lower rate of overdose than rats who were completely inexperienced with heroin. 
Consider the basic model, but with the following change to ins tantaneous utility. 
Utility d epends on the addiction level associa ted with the present environment, as 
before. However , the addiction levels associated with the other non-present environ-
ments a lso have minor impact on the utility function. 
Suppose that the state of the world at time t is Wt = j, j E {A , B}. The addiction 
level associated with environment k -=f j has a minor effect on utility. Before the 
agent realizes the true tolerance function: 
and after the agent realizes the true tolerance function : 
U(dr,a{ , xi,x~) = u(c1_,a{) + v(af,xi + ax~) 
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where a E [0, 1]. 
For ease of exposition, I will work with only the actnal problem to the individual. 
The resnlts are the same for the problem that the individual mistakenly perceives 
that he must solve. 
Again, begin by con sidering the first order conditions to the individual's problem. 
In environment. A , 
i = l 
<Xl 
+ L (1 - 11) biai-1a/3v2(af+i> xf+i + a xt+i) (2.17) 
i = l 
and in environment B, 
<Xl 
( B B)+ ~ s:i i-1/3 ( B B + A ) pu1 y - pat , at L 11u a v2 at+i , x t+i ax t+i 
i=l 
<Xl 
+ L(l - 11)biai- laf3v2 (at+i> xt+i + axf+J (2.18) 
i= l 
The spillover in addiction levels has two effects that are not present. in the case with 
no spillover. First, the addiction level associated with the non-present. environment 
enters directly into the tolerance fnnction . Therefore, as the amount or strength of 
the spillover (a) increases, marginal ntili ty from consmnption of the addictive good 
is weakly increasing. Second, the agent realizes that cnrrent consumption will h ave 
an effect not only on the periods in which the environment is the same as the cnrrent 
environment, bnt also on the periods in which the environment is different. Hence, 
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the "full cost" of consuming the addictive good is also increasing in a. 
Under this framework, the Bellman eqnation to the individual 's problem is 
(2.19) 
When a = 0, the aetna! problem that the individual must solve reduces to that 
given by Equation (2.2). First order conditions (2.17) and (2.18) reduce to (2.10) and 
(2.11) and Equation (2.19) reduces to Bellman Equation (2.13). 
At the other extreme, when a = 1, the problem is essentially the same problem 
as that given in theSE Model with Bellman eqnation given by (2.7).8 In this case, 
optimal consumption is independent of the environment. 
Without the separability of ntility with respect to environments, the value function 
can not be written as the sum of two separate value functions as in Proposition 2. 
However , Equation (2.19) can be re-written as 
S(xA,xB) = J-L [f(xA,xB)] + (1- J-L) [g(xA,xB)] (2.20) 
--~------~--~-------------
8Let :r = x 1 + x0 . Then, because preferences are the same, regardless of environment, the only 
difference between this problem and that of the SE ?dodd is in the updating of the consumption 
stock. 
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where 
and 
The problem to the individual when the environment is A is given by J(xA , xB ), 
and the problem to the individual when the environment is B is given by g(xA , x 8). 
Again, the agent's consumption problem can be viewed as a problem of two sepa-
rate personalities. Unlike the case with no spillover, however , the dual personalities in 
this case are intertwined. As O" increases, the separation between the two p ersonalities 
decreases. 
More work is needed in this area in order to characterize optimal b ehavior of an 
agent for whom there is spillover of addiction levels. 
2.6.2 Endogenous Environments 
Consider the case in which the probability of one of the environments is increasing 
in the addiction level associated with that environment. For example, consider an 
agent who can consume alcohol at home or at the neighborhood bar. Initially, h e 
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consumes more alcohol at the bar than at home. As he consumes more alcohol, his 
visits to the bar become more frequent. In this case, the probability of environment 
A , J.L , is an increasing function of the addiction level associated with that environment: 
J.L'(xA) 2: 0. Although the full cost of consuming the addictive good in environment A 
is greater when J.L'(xA) 2: 0 than when J.L'(xA) = 0, if the agent chooses to consume the 
good in environment A , the endogenous determination of environment may "speed 
up" the addiction process. As the agent's consumption increases, not only does 
the strength of future craving increase when he is in environment A, but also the 
probability that he will be in environment A also increases. 
2.6.3 P eer E ffects 
The model with cues can serve as a framework to study peer effects on consumption 
of addictive goods. For example, among adolescents, the peer group may be a strong 
determinant of the decision to b egin consuming an addictive good: 
The one feature that is consistent in every clinical case is the presence 
of peer-drug associations. The young person's pattern of drug use is 
matched, almost point by point by shared drug use with his or her "gang," 
bes t friend, and/or boyfriend/girlfriend. (Oetting and Beauvais 1988, p. 
156) . 
The model d eveloped in this paper presents a way to generate "neighborhoods" 
or "pockets" of addictive substance users without assuming an explicit preference for 
p eer or social acceptance. For example, suppose one environment is the presence of a 
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friend or gronp of friends. Then using the interaction among this gronp, it is possible 
to solve for conditions nnder which the entire group chooses to consnme the addictive 
good when they are together. Alternatively, there are conditions under which none 
of the group chooses to consume the addictive good. 
2 .6.4 Advertis ing 
Another application of this model is the stndy of how firms might be able to manip-
nlate environments in order to affect demand. Typical advertisements convey very 
little information abont such things as price and qnality. One explanation is that 
firms are trying to induce craving for goods by re-creating environments that arc 
associated with past consnmption of these goods. For example, advertisements for 
food, drink, or alcohol may try to indncc craving by simply showing the product 
or showing others enjoying their product. These phenomena may be captured by a 
generalization of the present model to one of goods that display some degree of habit 
formation. 
2 .6.5 Policy Implications 
The model with environmental cnes demonstrates the problem that cncs produced 
by other agents may impose negative externalities on the addict or recovering addict. 
Recall that if preferences are such that an agent would choose to qnit in one environ-
ment bnt not the other, she "regrets" her addiction in that environment. Her ntility 
is higher in time periods in which she is in the environment in which she docs not 
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focl addicted than when she is in the environment in which she is addicted. Cues 
produced by others that place her in the environment in whid 1 she is addicted is 
therefore a negative externality for her. 
From a policy p erspective, it may be possible to increase welfare to agents who 
are either addicts or recovering addicts by limiting their cxposnre to environmental 
cues associated with consumption of addictive goods. For example, smoking bans 
in public places may serve not only to provide clean air to nonsmokers, but also to 
reduce the temptation of t hose who arc trying to quit smoking. 
Lastly, the model also implies that drug education can a lso be wclfaro-enhancing, 
because drug education can inform agents abou t their true t olerance function. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The relapse rate among abusers of addictive substances is strikingly high . This phe-
nomenon has proven to be an intricate problem for addiction researchers from all 
fields. Previous economic research on addiction , however, h as not fully utilized find-
ings from oth er disciplines. Studies on how people misjudge the severity of fu tnre 
consequences of addictive substance usc expla in why people might begin to use an 
addictive subs tance that they eventually choose to quit. Research on conditioned 
responses offers an explanation for why addicts who decide to stop using addictive 
substances b egin to consume again , even if, at that point, they no longer have mis-
perceptions abou t the negative effects of consumption. 
In this paper, I have sh own that agents wh o misperccive the futmc consequences 
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of using addic tive substances m ay fa ll into this pa ttern of qnitting and relapse. This 
occnrs becanse preferences and environmental cnes becom e intertwined in snch a way 
th a t craving can be indnced simply by the presence of environm ental cues. 
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Chapter 3 An Empirical Test of Rational 
Addiction: Consumer Response to Price and 
Policy Changes 
3.1 Introduction 
Rational choice models of addiction describe perfectly rational, forward looking agents 
who may develop a harmful addiction. The Becker and Mmphy (1998) framework 
is an infinite horizon continuous t ime problem where utility is a function of current 
consumption of addictive and non-addictive goods, as well a.s a stock of past consump-
tion of the addictive good. The key to this model lies in the relaxation of the usual 
assumption of intertemporal separabili ty. Consumption patterns consistent with ad-
diction can result from forward-looking utility maximization with stable preferences; 
that is, the functional form of utility is invariant over time. In this model, agents fully 
anticipate the effects of their current consumption of a (harmfully) addictive good on 
futme utility. The model predicts that cmrent consumption of an addictive good is 
increasing in past consumption because past consumption increases current marginal 
utility of consumption. Fmthermore, if the agent is rational and forward looking, 
then current consumption should also be increasing in expected future consumption. 
In the previous chapter, I point out that the rational model omits two prevalent 
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features of addiction- misperception by agents of the future consequenres of consum-
ing the addictive good and the pattern of quitting and relapse that is frequently seen 
in addicts. Drawing on evidence from addiction research in other fields, I develop 
a behavioral model of addiction that captures these two features of addiction. Re-
lated economic research includes the work of Laibson (1999) , O'Donoghue and Rabin 
(1999), and Orphanides and Zervos (1995). 
Thus far , Becker and Murphy's rational model h as been the st andard model of 
addiction in economics. There have been a few empirical tests of the rational addic-
tion model that p ertain to a variety of addictive subs tances and activities, such as 
cocaine (Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998), alcohol (Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirta-
lan, 1998), and casino gambling (Nichols, 1999) . A few papers use data on cigarette 
consumption to conduct empirical tests of the rational addiction model. Examples 
include Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994), Chaloupka (1991) K eeler , Hu , Barnett 
and Manning (1993), and Grnber and Koszegi (1999). 
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (BGM) use state level annual cigarette tax re-
ceipts from 1955 through 1985 to mcasnre per capita consumption of cigarettes. They 
find that cigarettes are addictive. That is, current consumption is increasing in past 
con sumption. Furthermore, addicts are forward looking, as opposed to myopic, in 
that current consumption is found to be increasing in fu t ure consumption. Lastly, 
they find that long-run responses to permanent price ch anges arc a lmost twice as 
large as short nm responses. 
A serious problem with u sing cigarette and tobacco tax receipts to measure con-
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sumpt.ion is that., for most states, state-level tobacco taxes are paid by tobacco dis-
tributors, rather than tobacco consumers. For example, according to the California 
State Board of Equalization, the department that oversees cigarette and tobacco tax 
collections: "The [cigarette] tax and [cigarette and tobacco products] surtax are paid 
by distributors, who purchase tax stamps from banks and affix them to each package 
of cigarettes before distribution. Distributors can be reimbursed for these taxes by 
the businesses to whom they sell the cigarettes, and the businesses include the taxes 
as part. of the retail selling price of the cigarettes" (Cigarette and Tobacco Products 
Tax Law, 1998). Furthermore, cigarette distributors do not necessarily hold the same 
number of packs of cigarettes and number of stamps in st,ock. Therefore, state-paid 
tobacco taxes more accurately reflect distributors ' demand for cigarette and tobacco 
tax stamps, rather than consumer demand for cigarettes. Using state tax receipt data 
can therefore lead to mistaken inferences, as I discuss below. 
Chaloupka (1991) tests the rational model using data from the second National 
Health and Nutrition Examination Snrvey, which includes 28,000 respondents and 
covers the time p eriod 1976-1980. Unlike the aggregate data that. BGM use, these data 
describe the consumption of individuals. Like BGl\I, Chaloupka finds that. cigarettes 
are addictive and that individuals are not myopic. That is, he finds that both past 
and future consumption have positive effects on current consumption, although he 
finds long-run price elasticities that arc about half those of BGM. Chaloupka also 
estimates separate cigarett0 demand equations for subsamplcs based on educational 
attainment and age. HC' finds that for less educated and younger individuals, thC' 
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coefficient on fnture consumption is not significantly different from zero. Individua ls 
in these groups b ehave more myopically than do more edncated or older individnals . 
To test the rational model , at least three consecutive p eriods of da ta a re reqnired. 
However , the survey da ta tha t Chaloupka nses include only two consecutive p eriods . 
Therefore, for fntnre consnmption , he uses wha t respondents rep ort as curren t con-
snmption. For current consnmption , he uses reported one year lagged consnmption. 
Lastly, for past consnmption, he nses reported maximnm average daily quantity for 
those who b egan smoking more than two years ago ; otherwise past consnmption is 
recorded as zero. In all likelihood , this measm ement error is not indep endently and 
identically distributed across resp ondents. Therefore, the resulting estima tes may b e 
biased in an unanticipated m anner. 
Keeler , et a l. (1993) include an analysis of the ra tiona l model of addiction in their 
study of taxation and regula tion . T hey nse cigarette t ax receipts for the sta t e of Cali-
fornia as t he m easure of consnmption. Unlike the previons stndies, they acknowledge 
and attempt to correct for serial correla tion in th e ra tional model. As in the pre--
vions studies, they find a p ositive and significant coefficient on fnture consumption. 
However, they find a negative coefficien t on lagged consnmption, which is difficult to 
reconcile with the ra tiona l model. Their finding hints tha t the BGM implem en tation 
of the rational m odel is n ot very robnst to different econometric specifications, as 
Gruber and Koszegi (1999) explicit ly discuss in their p ap er. 
Gruber and Koszegi h ave a thorough critiqne of the m ethods n sed by BGM and 
Chalon pka . In particula r , they find that the BGM resnlts are ext remely sensitive to 
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different specifications of the model. They replicate the BGM analysis using a similar 
dataset of state level tax receipt data, and they find similar results. However , when 
Grnber and Koszegi attempt to control for any state-specific fixed effects, they find 
that the coefficient on future consumption is no longer significant. 
To provide a better test of forward-looking behavior, Gruber and Koszegi use 
the tax receipt data, as well as Vital Statistics Natality Data, to study the effect on 
consumption of announced tax increases that are not yet effective. This latter dataset 
describes the smoking behavior of expectant mothers. As predicted by the rational 
model, they find that consumption decreases during the period between enactment 
and implementation of tax hikes. 
The main problem with the dataset that Gruber and Koszegi use is that it is not 
representative of the population as a whole. Expectant mothers who smoke likely 
have lower discount rates than the average consumer. Furthermore, any concern 
that survey respondents may deny or downplay their consumption of su ch goods as 
cigarettes, alcohol, or illegal drugs due to socia l conformity should be heightened 
when the survey respondents a re pregnant women. 
The dataset that I use avoids the previously mentioned data problems. The data, 
compiled by Information Resources Incorporated from grocery store scanner data, 
describe weekly sales in 20 markets that span the states of California, Arizona, Col-
orado, Nevada, and Washington. 
The previous tests of the rational addiction model have focused on the model's 
predictions concerning consumption responses to fntme and past price changes. This 
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essay also allows an empirical test of the prediction that the response to an anticipated 
price change differs from the response to an unanticipated price change. 
In particular, I consider the consumption effects of three institutional changes that 
occur during the time period 1996 through 1999. The first is the ban on smoking 
in bars and taverns in California as part of the state's comprehensive "Smoke-Free 
Workplace" law. I argue that this is an anticipated permanent shock to future con-
sumption. 
Secondly, as a result of the settlement that the five largest tobacco companies 
signed with 46 states in November 1998, these companies raised wholesale tobacco 
prices by 45 cents per pack, the largest cigarette price increase in history. Although 
analysts, and perhaps smokers, may have predicted a price increase contingent on 
settlement of the litigation, it was not clear when a settlement would occur and 
what the terms of the settlement would be. Tobacco companies announced the price 
increase the same day that they signed the settlement. 
Lastly, in the November 1998 election, California voters approved a 50 cent tax 
increase on cigarettes. This tax increase was anticipated. The increase was not 
effective until January 1, 1999, but the official outcome of the election was announced 
in mid-November. The price increase due to the tobacco settlement occurred during 
the period between the approval of this tax and its implementation. Fortunately, for 
purposes of econometric identification, the tax increase applied to California only, 
whereas the tobacco settlement price increase affected the whole country. Therefore, 
I can study these two events separately. 
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The next section gives additional details on these three policy changes. Section 3 
lays ont the theoretical model of Becker and Murphy and discusses some of the econo-
metric issues that arise in estimation of the model. Section 4 provides a description 
of the data. 
Section 5 presents the empirical results. I begin by attempting to replicate the 
BGM results using the grocery store scanner data. Like BGM, I find that the co-
efficients on lagged and lead consumption are positive and significant. An attempt 
to correct for fixed trends in the panel data, however , reveals the sensitivity of the 
results to the econometric specification. While the results are not inconsistent with 
the rationa l model, they arc difficult to interpret within the context of the rational 
framework. 
As an additional modification, I assume that consumers forecast prices using 
lagged prices and other available information, rather than assume that they can per-
fectly predict future prices and consumption. While the results of this analysis arc 
not very different from the previous results, the price forecast results raise questions 
about the validity of the methods used in the majority of the empirical studies of 
ra tional addiction. 
Next, I consider the effects of the policy changes described in Section 2. I find that 
the ban on smoking in bars and restaurants has no effect on consumption. Again, the 
analysis of the smoking ban raises some issues with the econometric sp ecification of the 
rational model. Lastly, I compare the effects of the unanticipated price increase dne 
to the tobacco settlem ent and the anticipated Proposition 10 tax increase. Contrary 
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to the r ational model, I find that the consumption response to both price changes are 
simila r. 
Section 6 discusses some methodological issues, measurement. error and serial cor-
relation, that the results raise and Section 7 concludes. 
3.2 Institutional Background 
3.2.1 California Smoke-Free W orkp lace Law 
This paper considers the effects of California's "Smoke-Free Workplace" Law. As-
sembly Bill 13, introduced to tlw Assembly in December, 1992, and chaptered in 
July, 1994, added to the Labor Code a section prohibiting smoking of tobacco in any 
enclosed spaces of a workplace. All workplaces, with some exceptions which include 
bars and taverns, were to comply immediately. 1 Bars and taverns were to begin com-
pliance on January 1, 1997. However, assembly Bill 3037, chaptcred in September, 
1996, amended the Labor Code section to extend from January 1, 1997 to January 
1, 1998 the elate of compliance by bars and taverns. 
The California ban on smoking in bars and taverns provides a natura l test for 
the predictions of the rational model. This ban acts as a permanent shock to future 
con sumption for smokers. Consider the rational, forward-looking addict for whom 
this shock is prohibitive enough that he would quit smoking once the ban is in effect. 
1Therc arc a few workplaces which arc exempted from the smoke-free workplace laws such as 
private residences; employers with a total of five or fewer employees, with some a dditional conditions; 
or retail or wholesale tobacco shops and private smokers' lounges. Note that "retail or who lesale 
tobacco shop" is defined as "any business establishment the main purpose of which is the sale of 
tobacco products," (Cali fornia Labor Code Section 64.04.5) and therefore docs not include bars or 
taverns which a lso sell tobacco products. 
72 
This individnal shonld begin to decrease consnmption after the p assage of the law bnt 
prior to the date of compliance. The smoking b an is not a moneta ry price increase; 
therefore, t here is no need t o worry abont individnals who might stockpile cigarettes 
before the implem entation d a te, as could be a problem in an analysis of an anticipated 
tax or price increase. 
3.2.2 California Proposition 10 Tax Increase 
In th e November 1998 election, California voters passed Proposition 10, a measure 
tha t wonld increase tobacco taxes by 50 cents on J annary 1, 1999, to finance early 
childhood development program s. Proposition 10 passed with 50.4% of the vote, 
m aking it one of the n arrowest victories in California referenda history. 
I argn e tha t this tax increase to smokers is an anticipated price ch ange. The final 
on tcome for this prop osition was annonnced on November 12, 1998, yet the tax hike 
would not go into effect until J annary 1, 1999. Furthermore , this proposition received 
extensive press coverage not only because the outcom e was so close, but a lso b ecause 
Prop osit ion 10 was drafted by Hollywood actor , director and producer Rob R einer , 
who a lso helped finan ce the campaign. T here was also drama tic sp ending on the "No 
on 10" campaign: Tob acco companies a lone sp ent over $30 m illion . 
3.2.3 Tobacco Litigation Settlement Price Increase 
On November 23 , 1998, the five largest tobacco companies in the Unites Sta tes set-
tled a lawsuit filed by 46 st a tes, th e District of Columbia , and five U .S. territories. 
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The settlement called for tobacco companies to pay $206 billion dollars to reimburse 
states for providing health care to smokers. That same day, the three largest tobacco 
companies announced a 45 cent per pack price increase (Los Angeles Times, 1998). 
When compared to the Proposition 10 tax increase to be implemented on Jan-
uary 1, 1999, this price increase seems mnch less likely to h ave been anticipated by 
consmners. Althongh analysts may have predicted a price increase if the tobacco 
companies and states were to settle, they did not predict such a large price increase, 
in part because this was the largest one t ime price incrca.<;e in history. 
In addition, the settlement occmrcd quite rapidly. The terms of the settlement 
were not formulated until November 14, nine days before the price hike, and the 
states signed the settlement November 20. Fnrthermore, some stores raised prices 
right away, while other stores waited unt il distributors passed the price increase on 
to them before raising prices (Howe, 1998). 
3.3 Theoretical Model 
In the rational model of Becker and Mmphy (1988), period t ntility depends on the 
current consumption of the addictive consumption good, at, cnrrent consumption of 
the non-addictive consnmption good , Ct, and past consnmption of the addictive good 
as snmmarized by Xt . In their empirical test of the rational model, Becker, Grossman, 
and Murphy (1994) add an error term, et , which is also referred to as the "impact of 
nnmeasm ed life-cycle variables on ntility" (p. 398). Instantaneons ntilit.y is given by 
u(at, Ct, x,,, et), where the utility fnnction u(-) is concave in all its argnments. 
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Let the price of the addictive good at time t be Pt , with c1 as numeraire. If the 
agent's discount rate is 6, the agent's maximization problem nuder perfect foresight 
is: 
subject to 
00 
max L 6t- 1u(at, Ct, Xt, et) 
t=l 
00 
L 6t- l (ct + Ptat) = A 0 
t = l 
where x 0 , initial consnmption stock, is given exogenously and A0 , the present value 
of lifetime wealth, is assumed constant and exogenous. 
Let ..\ be the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Then the first order 
conditions associated with the maximization problem are: 
Ut(at, Ct,Xt,et) + L 61 aj-I,Bu3(at+j,Ct+j , Xt+j,et+j) .APt 
j = l 
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy assume a quadratic ntility function. Fmthermore, 
they assume that past consumption can be summarized by last. period's consumption. 
That. is, Xt = at- l· Under these assumptions, we get. t.he following demand function 
for the addictive good: 
(3.1) 
If t.he agent. can perfectly forecast. her future consumption, as is implicitly assmned 
75 
by BGM, then Equation (3.1) gives the agent's demand function. How0vcr, if the 
agent can not perfectly predict h er future consumption, then the demand funct ion 
can be rewritten as: 
where <I>t is the information available to the agent at time t 2 . Such information can 
include the history of past prices, history of past consumption, and any price or tax 
change annmmcements. 
According to this model, past consumption of the addictive good increases current 
consumption if (h > 0. That is, the addictive good is trnly addictive if fh is positive 
and significant. If the good is addictive and the agent is forward looking, current 
consumption will depend on futmc consumption; that is 802 > 0. 
A serious problem for estimating either Equation (3.1) or Equation (3.2) is the en-
dogenci ty of lagged consumption and lead consumption (actual or expected). Current 
consumption (at) is a function of lagged consumption ( at-d and lead consumption 
(at+d, while lagged consumption (at_1) is a function of at and at_2 . Likewise, at+l 
is a function of at and at.+l· Therefore, these two right-hand side variables, at- l and 
at+1 , are likely h1ghly correlated with the error, et. Least squares estimation would 
lead to inconsistent estimates. 
Previous empirical studies have attempted to find instrnmcnts for lead and lagged 
consumption. The most common instruments arc lags and leads of prices. Lagged 
2T his simple relationship between Equations (3.1) and (3.2) a rises because of the assumption of 
quadratic utility. 
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prices a rc correlated with lagged consnmption, and lead prices are correla ted with lead 
consnmption . Equation (3.1) implies that, at-l and at+l fixed, current consnmption at 
is independent of lagged and lead prices. Unfortnnately, the validity of lagged and lead 
prices as instrnments for lagged and lead consumption relics on stron g assnmptions 
on model specification and measurement errors. 
Lastly, note that current period prices are assnmed to be exogenons. It may be 
that this assnmption is not too problematic during many time periods studied in 
which supply is very elastic at the m arket level. The 45 cent price increase dne to 
the tobacco settlement is clearly an cxogenons price shock during this sample period. 
However , evidence that retail prices rise in advance of an anticipated tax increase 
would indicate otherwise. 
It conld be argued that t he 50 cent tax increase in California is an endogenous 
price change. That is, decreased demand in California would make it easier to pass a 
tax increase. However, as seen in Section 5 below, there is no apparent demand shift 
in California dnring the sample period. In fact, even though there is a downward trend 
in consnmption, consnmption in California is decreasing slower than consumption in 
the other states over the sample period. 
Overall, prices do not appear to be driven by demand shocks. There is lit t le 
weekly variation in prices until the sharp price increase in November , 1998, even 
thongh weekly consumption fluctuates. As discnssed in section 5 below, prices over 
the sample period have a slight npward trend while there is a downward trend in 
consnmption. However, the trend in prices is fairly constant across states, even 
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though the trend in consmnption varies greatly. 
3.4 Data Description 
Information Resources, Inc., Sales Data. The consumption and price data 
employed in this analysis are scanner data obtained from Information Resources In-
corp orated (IRI), a company that specializes in collecting scanner data from various 
grocery stores, drugstores, and convenience stores. 
The unit of observation is the Designated l\ Iarketing Area (Dl\IA) defined by 
Nielsen Media Research. DMAs are mutually exclusive and are defined as "all counties 
whose largest viewing share is given to [television] stations of that same market area" 
(Nielsen l\Iedia Research website http:/ fwww.nielsenmedia.com). Dl'viAs cover all of 
the contiguous states, Hawaii and parts of Alaska. 
The IRI data include weekly sales from January 1, 1996, through May 9, 1999, 
in 20 different markets that. cover California, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada and Wash-
ington.3 Eleven of these DMAs are California markets. IRI provides data on total 
revenues and total units sold in each DMA in each week. The average price of a pack 
of cigarettes within a DMA can then be calculated. Prices include state and federal 
cigarette and tobacco taxes, but do not include any additional state or local retail 
sales tax. As mentioned earlier, state cigarette and tobacco taxes are paid by distrib-
utors, and federal cigarette and tobacco taxes are paid by t he cigarette manufacturer. 
3There arc actually 21 markets that cover the states of California, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada 
and ' Vashington. One of the marke ts, the Grand Junction-l"d ontrose marke t in Colorado, exhibits a 
sharp decr<'asc in sales that starts in the beginning of August 1998. Because it is not clear whether 
this decline is due to a d<'mand shift or a problem with the data collection, I have eliminated this 
market from the analysis. 
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Thus, the calculated price is the average price paid by consumers within a DMA net 
of (i.e., before) sales tax. 
Yearly Dl\IA popnlation estimates through 1998 were obtained from the Polk 
Company, a company that specializes in collecting DMA-level d ata for marketing 
purposes. DMA populations for 1999 are estimated using linear projections based 
on population data from 1995-1998. In order to calculate per capita consumption of 
ciga rettes purchased from the IRI grocery stores, I usc a 52 week moving averag<' of 
yearly population. 
Board of Equalization Tax Receipt Data. In addition , I have collected 
California tobacco tax receipts from the California State Board of Equalization. These 
data allow for comparison between IRI sales data and state tax receipts. 
In order to calculate the BOE per capita consumption variable, I use connty 
population estimates from the Bnrean of Economic Analysis. 
Finally, per capita income data by county from 1996-1997 were obtained from 
the Bnrcan of Economic Analysis. Income for 1998-1999 arc estimated using simple 
linear projections based on income data from 1983-1997. Per capita income used in 
the regressions are 52 wE:'ck moving averages of yearly income. 
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3. 5 Empirical Analysis 
3.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis arc summarized in Table 
3.1. Per capita cigarette pack consumption in week tis denoted at . The average retail 
price of a cigarette pack in week t is denoted Pt. 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics 
variable SOllrCe description mean 
at IRI and Polk weekly per capita consumption (packs) 0.261 
at BOE and BEA CA monthly per capita consumption (packs) 4.311 
Pt IRI price (January 1996 dollars) 1.985 
std dev 
0 .192 
0.679 
0.441 
yt BEA annual income (1000's of 1996 dollars) 20.333 3.290 
Correlation between weekly per capita consumption and real price = -0.404 
Correlation between CA monthly per capita consumption and real price (in CA) - -0.573 
Figures 3.1-3 .2 and Table 3.2 further describe the weekly IRI sales data. 3. 1 
plots the time series of per capita units of cigarette sales, where the data have been 
aggregated to the state level. The time series of average prices by state is plotted in 
Figure 3.2. It is dear that there is a general downward trend in consumption and an 
upward trend in prices. 
Week 105 is the first. week of 1998, when the ban on smoking in bars began. 
Examination of the California series indicates that the ban has no obvious effect on 
cigarette prices and per capita consumption. If anything, the downward trend in 
consmnption appears to slow clown after the implementation of t he ban, a finding 
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that is consistent with forward-looking agents decreasing consumption in advance of 
the implementation. However, the lack of data on consumption prior to the enactment 
of the legislation makes inference difficult. The tobacco settlement was signed by the 
five largest tobacco companies on November 23, 1998, in Week 152. The 45 cent 
per pack price increase was announced the same day. Average prices in some states 
increased immediately (Nevada for example) , while in other states, prices increased 
more slowly (Washington and Colorado, for example). Aside from the general time 
trend, there does not appear to be any significant effect on consumption. Week 157 
is the first week of 1999, when the 50 cent Proposition 10 tax increase went into 
effect. Average prices started to increase prior to the new year, perhaps because 
grocery stores anticipated that consumers might stockpile cigarettes before the new 
tax increase. Indeed, there does appear to be a temporary increase in consumption 
(or sales) prior to week 157. 
Table 3.2 presents average weekly per capita consumption by state over six-month 
intervals. Again,the downward trend in consumption is apparent. 
Table 3.2: Weekly per capita consumption by state and six month interval 
Time period CA AZ co NV WA AZ,CO,NV,WA 
01.01.96-06.30.96 0.200 0.317 0.437 0.299 0.394 0.362 
07.01.96-12.31.96 0.195 0.291 0.429 0.308 0.360 0.347 
01.01.97-06.30.97 0.176 0.252 0.395 0.296 0.326 0.317 
07.01.97-12.31.97 0.177 0.238 0.353 0.264 0.305 0.290 
01.01.98-06.30.98 0.163 0.209 0.303 0.243 0.279 0.259 
07 .01 . 98-12.31.98 0.147 0.183 0.246 0.233 0.217 0.220 
01.01.99-05.09.99 0.113 0.147 0.194 0.186 0.177 0.176 
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IRI sales d ata in California and the Board of Equalization tax receipt data are 
compared in Figure 3.3. The IRI data arc aggregated into monthly sales for easier 
comparison with the BOE data. The IRI and BOE data follow fairly closely, with 
the IRI sales about one-tenth of the BOE tax receipts , until November , 1998.4 Once 
the weekly sales d a ta are aggregated into monthly data, there appears to be no 
stockpiling of cigarettes before the January 1, 1999, tax increase. However , it appears 
as if cigarette distributors are s tockpiling cigarettes (or tax s tamps) from November 
through December 1998. In January 1999, t ax receipts drop sh arply. 
3.5.2 Replication of Becker Grossman Murphy (1994) 
Table 3.3 presents the results from attempts to replicate the BGM analysis using 
various d a t a sources . Recall tha t BGM's analysis focuses on estimation of Equation 
(3 .1). As a basis of comparison, one set of BGM two stage leas t squares estimates 
(2SLS) is reported in Column (i) of the top panel (corresponding to BGM's Table 3 , 
Column (i) on page 406) . To address the problem of endogeneity of lagged and lead 
consumption, they use lagged and lead prices as instruments. Additional regressors 
are full sets of dummy variables for sta t e and year. The reported estimates corresp ond 
to the identified pa rameters of Equa tion (3.1). 
There a re some important distinctions between the da ta set tha t they employ and 
4 This proportion suggests that 90% of the cigarettes sold in California a re sold outside of the 
grocery s tores in the IRI data. 1\Iaintaincd assumpt ions in this analysis arc that variation in grocery 
store purchases with prices (and other variables) is representative of the smoking population and 
that this propor t ion is constant across states and over t ime. However, measured levels of per capi ta 
consumption a re affected by this low proportion because the population used to calculate per capita 
consumption is population of the en t ire market, not the populat ion that shops at those grocery 
sto res. Furthermore, as I discuss later, the data may not capture casual smokers. 
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the data sets that I usc. The first is that BGM nsc annual per capita consumption as 
implied by the state tax receipts. I use weekly per capita cigarette consumption for the 
regressions using the IRI data, and monthly p er capita consumption for the regression 
that uses the BOE tax data. Prices in my data set are expressed as January 1996 
dollars, and weekly or monthly (for IRI and BOE, respectively) incom e is expressed 
as thousands of January 1996 dollars. BGM use hundreds of 1969 dollars for annual 
income and 1969 cents for prices. I use full sets of dummy variables for month, not 
year, for the IRI data analyses. For the BOE analysis, I use a linear time trend 
instead , because there are only 35 observations. Lastly, I do not replicate their use 
of the indices for importing and exporting across stat e lines and for long distance 
smuggling . 5 
The top p anel of Table 3.3 reports 2SLS estimates. Column (ii) presents 2SLS 
estimates using the IRI data. Additional regressors arc dummy variables for state. 
Estimates using the BOE tax receipt data over the time period J anuary 1996-March 
1999 are presented in Column (iii). Lastly, for another comparison with the BOE tax 
receipt results, Column (iv) presents 2SLS estimates using IRI data for the state of 
California only. 
Standard errors are in parentheses below the cstima t.es.6 Lastly, implied short-
nm price elasticities and long-run price elasticities evaluated at the sample means arc 
5 In constructing the long-distance smuggling index, BGl\I assume that states located over 1,000 
miles away from Kentucky, Virginia, and North Carolina do not smuggle. All five states in my 
sample fa ll in this category. The short-distance smuggling index is a function of the difference 
between neighboring states' tobacco and cigarette taxes, which do not vary much , if at all, in my 
dataset. 
6 Although they are the correct standard errors for 2SLS estimates, t hey do not take into account 
the longitudinal nature of the panel data. The true standard errors are likely larger than those 
reported in the table. 
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reported. 7 
The lower panel of Table 3.3 presents results from the first stage regressions. The 
dependent variable is per capita consumption. Regressors include current, lagged 
and lead prices, as well as income. In the second stage, the fitted, rather than actua l, 
values of lagged and lead p er capita consumption a re used. 
Results based on IRI data 
Compare the first two columns. Like BGM, I find that the coefficients on lagged 
and lead consumption a rc both positive and significant. According to the rational 
framework, the positive coefficient on lagged consumption implies that cigarettes are 
addictive and the positive coeffi cient on lead consumption implies that smokers are 
forward looking. The coefficient on lagged consumption is greater t han the coefficient 
on lead consumption, as occurs if the discount r ate is less t han one. 
To assess the rela tionship b etween con sumption and price, focus on estimated 
elasticities, rather than the estimates of the coefficient on price. Otherwise, the 
difference in consumption units (annual vs. weekly vs. monthly) and price units 
7T he short-run price elasticities are calculated as follows: 
dat 83 
dPt 82(1 - (i>I)(¢2) 
and the long-run price elasticities are calcaulated as follows: 
daoo 83 
dP 82(1- ¢1)(¢2- 1) 
where ¢ 1 and ¢2 are given by: 
1 - (1- 48~8)1 
¢ 1 = 282 
1 + (1 - 48~8)1 
¢ 2 = 282 
See BGM Appendix A for derivation. 
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( 1969 cents vs. 1996 dollars) confuses the comparison. 
Comparison between the first two columns reveals that short-run price elasticity 
calculated using the IRI data is much greater than the elasticity that BGM find. In 
fact , consumers represented by the IRI data appear to be over three times as sensitive 
to price as the cigarette distributors represented by the tax r eceipt data that BGM 
use. One possible reason for this difference in response to permanent price changes 
may be the timing of purch ases. The IRI data are weekly, whereas the BGM data arc 
yearly. Another possible reason for the difference in elasticities may be measurement 
error in price in the BGM dataset. The prices used in their analysis a re the retail 
prices paid by consumers, but the consumption variable is distributors' consumption 
of tax stamps. 
Like BGM, I find that long-nm price elasticities are greater t han short-run price 
elasticities. They argue that this relationship lends support to the rational addiction 
m odel. However , the LeChatalicr principle guarantees that all goods, not just addic-
tive goods, are more elastic in the long run than in the short nm. That is, because 
other consumption goods may b e held fixed in the short nm but not in the long run, 
short-run demand elasticities a re lower than long-run demand elasticities. 8 
Lastly, BGM find that the relationship between cigarette consumption and income 
is positive and significant, whereas the coefficient on income in the IRI regression is 
negative and significant . The dummy variables for states control for any interstate 
differences in income. However , because the data a re market-level data, the nega-
tive coefficient on incom e captures intrastate, m arket level differences in income and 
8 See Chapter 3 of Samuelson (1947). 
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consumption. The nPgative coefficient appears to capture the cross-sectional relation-
ship between cigarette consumption and income. Of the total variation in the income 
data, 99.2% is due to variation between markets, whereas only 0.8% is due to varia-
tion within markets, over time. Therefore, the estimated income effect is unlikely to 
be caused by the downward trend of consumption as incomes have risen. 
The BGM data span the years between 1955 and 1985, whereas the IRI data 
is very recent (1996-1999) . The finding of a negative coefficient. on income in the 
analysis that uses the IRI data may support the assertion of Keeler, ct. al. (1993) 
that. during the past 30 years, cigarettes have moved from being a normal good to an 
inferior good. 
Consider the first. stage regression results in the second panel of Table 3.9 The 
coefficients on current, lagged and lead prices all have the expected sign, according 
to the rational addiction model. According t.o Equation (3. 1), lead and lagged prices 
have a negative effect on current consumption b ecause these prices affect. current. 
consumption through lead and lagged consumption, which are not held fixed. 
Results based on BOE data 
The regression results based on the BOE data arc striking. The coefficients on lagged 
and lead consumption are positive, but not. significantly different from zero at con-
ventional levels of significance. These results suggest that, for cigarette distributors, 
cigarettes arc not an addictive good. 
9 T hc first stage regTessions include not only prices. but also all other exogenous variables in the 
model. However , I only report the coefficients on price in Table 3. 
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Price elasticities are much sm aller than those ba._<;cd on the IRI California only 
data rep orted in Column (iv), but they are close to t he price elas ticit ies that BGM 
found (Column (i)) . Cigarette dis tributors appear to be less sensitive to price changes 
than consnmcrs . As m entioned ab ove, one possible reason for the differen ce in price 
elasticity b etween the BOE and IRI California only resnlts may b e the timing of pur-
chases. The BOE da ta is m on thly, wh ereas the IRI da ta is weekly. Any int ra-mon th 
resp onse to price ch anges by cigare tte distribntors is not cap t ured. As wit h the BGM 
data, anoth er possible reason for the difference in elasticities may be m easurement 
error in p rice in the BOE d a taset. The prices nsed are the prices paid by consnmers, 
wh ereas the consnmption variable is distribntors' consnmp tion of tax stamps. 
Consider the first stage regression rcsnlts. The coefficien t on cnrrcnt price is neg-
a tive, as exp ected. The coefficien t on lagged price is positive b n t sm all in magnitude 
and not significantly different from zero. Lastly, the coefficien t on lead p rice is positive 
and significant. This result is m ost likely led by the last few m onths of t he sample in 
which distributors appear to b e stockpiling cigaret tes in advance of the Prop osition 
10 t ax hike (recall Figure 3.3) . During this time, prices a re rising due t o the tobacco 
settlement, but sales are a lso increasing. 
R esu lts based on IRI data (California only) 
Lastly, compare the param eter estimates for California only (Column (iv)) with the 
param et er estimates obta ined when all fives sta tes arc inclndcd in the analysis . The 
estima ted coefficients arc all of the sam e sign. T he coefficien t on lagged consump tion 
is sm aller in m agnitude and t he coefficient on lead consump tion is greater in magni-
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t ude than th ose rep orted in Column (ii) . This implies a larger p oint estima te of the 
discount ra te to Californians (8 = g:;g~ = .86) than th e point estimate of the discount 
rate of the whole sample ( 8 = g:~~~ = .45). 
California consumers are over twice as sensitive to price ch anges in the short run 
as consumers in the wh ole sample, and almost twice as sensitive to p ermanent price 
changes in the long nm. That the California results are differen t from t he general 
results suggests tha t p erhaps allowing for st a te-specific coefficients, or at least state-
specific t ime trends , is a n ecessary modification. 
3 .5.3 State-specific Time Trends 
The BGM replications include dummy variables for m on ths. These variables may 
account for general variation across time, but t hey can not cap ture st a te-sp ecific or 
market specific time t rends. The dummy variables for sta tes may capture fixed effects, 
but not fixed trends . T h e graphs in Figure 3.1 indicate tha t each state h as a general 
downward trend in consumption, but som e st a tes trend downward fas t er than others . 
For example, a t the beginning of the time series, the difference b etween the highest 
and lowest per capita cigarette pack consumption (between California and Colorado) 
is 0.29. Both st a t es h ave a downward trend in consumption , but Colorad o's ra t e is 
faster than tha t of California. At the end of th e time series, t his difference is 0.07. 
As in Gruber and K oszegi, a regression using first differences of the independent 
and dependent variables may capture these fixed t rends. However, because the IRI 
d ata p ertain to weekly sales, there appears to b e much negatively correla t ed week- to-
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week variation (see Figure 3.1) that. could be easily explained by measmcment errors 
in reporting or other timing issues. 
As an alternative approach, I expand the preceding analysis by including state-
specific linear time trends. Table 3.4 reports the results of a 2SLS regression using 
the IRI data with state-specific time trend variables. As in the analysis summarized 
in Table 3.3, instruments for lagged and lead consumption a rc lagged and lead prices. 
First stage regression results arc presented in the lower panel of Table 3.4. The results 
presented in this table are analogous to those presented in Column (ii) of Table 3.3. 
Consider first the estimated relationship between price and consumption. The 
point estimate of the coefficient on current. price is similar to that. in Column (ii) of 
Table 3.3 (-0.087 vs. -0.117) as arc the estimated short-run price elasticity (-1.666 vs. 
-1.314) and long-run price elasticity (-2.770 vs. -2.791). 
Again, the coefficients on lagged and lead consumption arc positive and signifi-
cant. Unlike the results of the 2SLS regression without state-specific time trends, the 
coefficient. on lead consumption is greater than the coefficient on lagged consumption. 
Ass1 uning that. the econometric model is specified correctly, the finding of a larger 
coefficient. on lagged than on lead consumption is difficult. to reconcile. Recall that. 
the coefficient on lead consumption divided by the coefficient. on lagged consumption 
should yield the discount rate of consumers. The estimates of the coefficients in Table 
3.4 imply that. the point. estimate of the discount. rate is greater than one. 
To examine whether the inclusion of state-specific time trends improves the fit of 
the model, I conduct a Wald test. of joint. significance of the state-specific time trends. 
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Table 3.4: 2SLS regression with state-specific time trend 
Dependent variable is per capita consumption. 
at-1 0.330 
SR price elasticity 
LR price elasticity 
R 
N 
(0.048) 
0.431 
(0.055) 
-0.087 
(0.019) 
-0.058 
(0.020) 
-1.666 
-2.770 
0.335 
3410 
Standard errors arc in parentheses. Additional regressors arc state-specific time 
trends and full sets of dummy variables fo r mont h and state. First stage regres-
sors include lagged and lead prices as well as the other explanatory variables. 
First stage regressions 
Dependent variable is per capita consumption 
P t -0.188 
(0.072) 
Pt- 1 -0.109 
(0.056) 
P t+1 -0.047 
(0.056) 
-2 
R 0.334 
The F -statis tic for the joint test , which is clistribntcd F [5, 3357], is 5.011 whereas the 
critical value for the 99th percentile is less than 1.69. Therefore, the test. rejects the 
null hypothesis that t he coefficients on the state-specific time trends are jointly zero 
at. the 1% significance level. 
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3.5.4 Price Forecasts 
R('Call from Section 3 that the model estimated in the above regressions is given 
by Equation (3.1), in which cmTcnt consumption is a function of actual future con-
smnption. Without developing an explicit model of expectations, using actual future 
prices as an instrument for actua l future consumption iu the above regressions im-
plies that agents perfectly forecast, prices and consumption. f\Iost likely, previous 
empirical studies have viewed actual fu ture price and consumption as proxies for ex-
pectations generated under the assumption of rational expectations. Instead, it seems 
more reasonable to explicitly model expectations based on information available at 
the time that these expectations arc formed. To account for this consideration, I es-
timate Equation (3.2) rather than Equation (3.1). That is, I include expected future 
consumption rather than actual future consumption as a right-hand side variable. 
As instruments for lagged consumption and expected lead consumption, I use the 
one-period lag of price and one-period-ahead forecast of price. Price forecasts are 
estimated using current price and two lags of price: 
(3.3) 
Table 3.5 reports results from the price forecast regressions. 
The results of the price forecast regressions reveal that current price predicts fu ture 
price very closely. One-period lagged price adds a little m ore explanatory power, but 
th e coefficients on two-period lagged price are not significantly different from zero. 
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Table 3.5: Price forecast regressions 
Dep endent variable is futnre price Pt+l· 
M11ltistate CA only 
fixed trends no fixed trends 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
Pt 0.913 0.915 0.854 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023) 
Pt- t 0.066 0.067 0.111 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.030) 
Pt-2 0.016 0.013 0.031 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.023) 
R 0.987 0.987 0.984 
N 3432 3432 1892 
Standard errors are in parentheses. For Column (i) the forecast 
includes state-specific time trends whereas the forecast only 
includes a gen eral time trend for Columns (ii) a nd (iii). 
These declining coefficients over time are as expected. All together, in conjunction 
with the time trends, the independent variables predict over 98% of the variation in 
future price. 
The high correlation between prices in adjacent time periods raises questions about 
the validity of lagged and lead prices as ins truments for lagged and lead consumption 
in the basic model. That is, cnrrent consumption may not be independent of lagged 
and lead prices when lagged and lead consumption arc held fixed. These results imply 
that perhaps two-period lead and lagged prices should be used as instruments. 
Table 3.6 presents the results from 2SLS regressions where predicted, ra ther than 
actual, price is a first stage regressor. Columns (i) and (ii) use data from all five 
states. Column (i) allows for state-specific time trends, whereas Column (ii) d oes 
not. Lastly, Column (iii) uses the California data only. The lower panel presents first 
st age r egression results. 
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T he results in Column (i) arc comparable to the results in Table 3.4. Results in 
Columns (ii) and (iii) arc comparable to those in Table 3.3, Columns (ii) and (iv), 
respectively. Based on comparison with these preceding rcsnlts , it is apparent that, 
for the analysis without state-specific time trends and the California only analysis, the 
estimated coefficients on price and income and the implied price elasticities are similar 
to those found before. When comparing the analyses that include state-specific time 
trends, we find that the coefficients on price and income are greater in magnitude 
when expected future price rather than actual future price is used as an instrument 
(-0.131 vs. -0.087 for price, and -0.090 vs. -0.058 for income). Short-run response 
to price changes is a lso more pronounced: short-run price elasticity of -2.014 when 
expected future price is an instrument as compared to a short-rnn price elasticity of 
-1.666 when actual future price is used as an instrument. 
The estimates of the coefficients on lagged consumption are smaller in magnitude 
when expected rather than realized future prices are used as instruments. Lastly, 
when data from all states are nscd and state-specific time trends arc included, the 
coefficient on future consumption is smaller in the 2SLS regression with expected 
future price as an instrument than in the regression with actual future price as an 
instrument. However , when state-specific time trends arc not included or when only 
California data are used, the opposite occurs: the coefficient on future consumption 
is larger when expected fnture price is an instrument than when aetna! future price 
is used. 
Consider now a comparison across columns of Table 3.6. Columns (i) and (ii) 
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Table 3.6: 2SLS Estimation of Equation 3.2 
Dependent variable is per capita consumption. 
Multi-state CA only 
fixed trends no fixed trends 
(i) ( ii) (iii) 
at-1 0.235 0.367 0.248 
(0.068) (0.058) (0.072) 
E [at+1] 0.400 0.288 0.329 
(0.080) (0.077) (0.084) 
Pt -0.131 -0.122 -0 .189 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.045) 
yt -0.090 -0.087 -0.155 
(0.027) (0.030) (0.051) 
SR price elast icity -2.014 -1.569 -3.747 
LR price elasticity -2.731 -2.691 -5.150 
R 0.336 0.320 0.325 
N 3370 3370 1859 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Expected price is forecas t using 3 lags of price. 
Additional regressors in both columns are full sets of dummy variables for state 
and month. Additional regressors in the first column are state-specific t ime trends. 
First s tage regressions 
Dependent variable is per capita consumption 
Pt 3.054 -4.618 -5.934 
(3.272) (1.435) (1.409) 
Pt- t 0.178 -0.495 -0.969 
(0.290) (0.136) (0.235) 
E [Pt+d -3.595 4.809 6.519 
(3.575) (1.562) (1.631) 
-2 
0.318 R 0.335 0.317 
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reveal the same relationships as were found when comparing Table 3.4 and Column 
(ii) of Table 3.3. Coefficients on income and price and similar, but the short nm 
elasticity is greater in magnitude than the short. nm elasticity that results from the 
regression without a state-specific time trend. The higher estimated elasticity of 
short-run demand is dnc in part to the smaller coefficient on lagged consumption 
together with the larger coefficient on lead consumption. In fact., when state-specific 
time trends are included in the model, t he coefficient on lagged consumption is smaller 
than the coefficient on lead consumption. Once again, a Wald test rejects at the 1% 
significance level the hypothesis that the state-specific time trends are jointly zero 
(F[5, 3318] = 4.821). 
Comparing the adjusted R 2 from the second stage of the regression provides a cur-
sory comparison between the two models represented by Equations (3.1) and (3.2). 
Consider the regression results using data from all five states. When expected price 
is used as an instrument, 0.336 of the variation in consumption is explained by vari-
ation in th e independent variables that enter the second stage of the regression, in-
cluding predicted values of lagged consumption and predicted values of expected lead 
consumption. When actual future price is used as an instrument, variation in the 
independent variables that. enter the second stage of the regression explains 0.335 of 
the variation in consumption. The difference is probably not. statistically significant, 
and this test. is not a formal test of one model versus another because the models arc 
not. nested models. 
To test whether one equation fits the data better than the other, I apply Davidson 
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and MacKinnon's J test10 to the second stage of the regression. Unfortunately, as 
can happen when comparing nonnested models, the test rejects one model in favor of 
the other, and then rejects the other in favor of the first. In comparing the models 
without state-specific time trends, the coefficient on the model described by Equation 
(3.1) is 1.324 with a standard error of 1.405, and therefore this model is rejected in 
favor of the model described by Equation (3.2). On the other hand, the coefficient 
on the Equation (3.2) model is -0.008 with standard error 1.347, and therefore this 
model is rejected for the Equation (3.1) model. The results for comparing the models 
with state-specific time trends arc qualitatively similar. 
Lastly, consider the first stage results in the lower panel of Table 3.6. Because 
expected future price is forecast using current price and two lags, there is obviously 
high correlation among these variables. From the first stage results, we see that 
this high correlation leads to anomalous estimates. In Column (i), none of the three 
coefficients is statistically different from zero. Only the coefficient on expected futme 
price has the expected negative sign. In Columns (ii) and (iii), all the coefficients 
are significantly different from zero, but the coefficients on expected futme price are 
positive. 
10See Chapter 7 of Greene (1993). 
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3.5.5 Institutional Changes 
Smoking Ban 
Examination of Figure 3.1, together with Table 3.2, docs not reflect any obvious effect 
of the ban on smoking in bars and taverns in California. In this section, I re-estimate 
the cigarette demand function using an indicator variable for the enactment of the 
smoking ban. It takes the value one if the state is California and the date is January 
1, 1998 or later, and zero otherwise. 
As reported in the top panel of Table 3. 7, the coefficient on the smoking ban 
dummy variable is positive and significant, but small. In the first stage regression 
results, the coefficient on the smoking ban dummy variable is also positive and sig-
nificant. This result seems surprising, given that the smoking ban should decrease 
smoking. One explanation may be that , following passage of the ban but prior to 
its implementation, cigarette consumption began declining in anticipation of its im-
plementation, as predicted by the rational model. In fact, the rate of decline may 
decrease at the time the ban becomes effective, and therefore, the coefficient on the 
smoking ban is positive. However, without additional data on consumption before 
the passage of the legislation, this hypothesis is not testable. 
Another important explanation is that the monthly dummy variables are picking 
up relevant variation across time. That is, this variation may be exactly what we 
would like the smoking ban dummy variable to capture. Therefore, it is possible that 
the smoking ban has no effect on cigarette consumption, but the positive coefficient 
on the smoking ban variable simply reflects a time variation that neither the general 
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monthly varia tion nor t he California-specific time trend is picking up. 
An alternative approach is to exclude the monthly dummy variables from t he anal-
ysis , and ins tead include various time trends and interactions between the smoking 
ban variable and these trends. As a basis of comparison, Table 3.8 presents results 
from replications of Table 3.3, Column . (ii) that exclude monthly dummy variables. 
Column (i) of Table 3.8 includes a linear time trend instead , and Column (ii) includes 
adds a quadra tic t ime trend. The results in Table 3.8 highlight the sensit ivity of the 
model to the econometric specification. Comparison with Table 3.3, Column (ii) , 
reveals tha t the regression with both linear and quadra tic time trends yields simila r 
coefficients on lagged and lead consumption. Note tha t , as in Table 3.3, Column (ii) , 
the coefficient on lead consumption in Table 3.8 , Column (ii) is highly significant. 
When the regression includes only a linear time trend, however , the coefficient on 
lead consumption is not significantly different from zero. The implication from this 
regression is tha t cigarette consumers a re not forward looking . The coefficients on 
price and the short-run price elasticities are smaller , especially when both a linear 
and quadra tic time trend are included in the regression. 
In Column (i) , the coefficien t on the t ime t rend is positive, but insignificant. 
T his s ign is surprising, given tha t there seems to b e a steady downward t rend in 
consumption (recall Figm e 3. 1). It. appears tha t lagged and lead consumption arc 
capturing the d ownward trend. The coefficients on these variables sum t o less than 
one, implying a downward trend. 
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Table 3.7: Effect of smoking ban on consumption 
Dependent variable is per capita consmnption. 
fixed trends no fixed trends 
(i) (ii) 
at- 1 0.328 0.408 
(0.048) (0.054) 
0.432 0.306 
(0.055) (0.059) 
-0.087 -0.107 
(0.019) (0.022) 
[-1.635] [-1.474] 
-0.058 -0.065 
(0.020) (0.023) 
Smoking Ban -0.002 0.019 
(0.005) (0.006) 
R 0.335 0.328 
N 3410 3410 
Standard errors arc in parentheses. Additional regressors arc 
full sets of dummy variables for month and state. Additional 
regressors in column (i) are state specific time trends. 
First stage regressions 
Dependent variable is per capita consumption 
Pt -0.188 -0.179 
(0.072) (0.072) 
Pt- 1 -0.109 -0.115 
(0.056) (0.056) 
Pt+l -0.047 -0.038 
(0.056) (0.056) 
Smoking ban -0.003 0.082 
(0.021) (0.011) 
-2 
R 0.334 0.325 
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Table 3.8: 2SLS Estimation of Equation 3.1 with time trend 
Dependent variable is per capita consumption. 
i) ii) 
at-1 0.553 0.551 
t 
SR price elasticity 
LR price elasticity 
R 
N 
(0.086) (0.024) 
0.101 
(0.139) 
-0.085 
(0.036) 
-0.132 
(0.065) 
0.398 X 10-4 
(0.298 X 10- 11 ) 
-0.770 
-1.870 
0.280 
3410 
0.386 
(0.034) 
-0.023 
(O.Oll) 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
-0.209 X 10- 3 
(0.939 X 10- 4 ) 
0.135 X 10- 5 
(0.610 X 10- 6 ) 
-0.570 
-2.778 
0.302 
3410 
Standard errors are in parentheses . Additional regressors are full sets of 
dummy variables for state. 
Table 3.9 presents results from 2SLS regression of Equation (3.1) that includes the 
dnmmy variable for the smoking ban but does not include monthly dummy variables. 
The regression associated with Column (i) includes a linear time trend. The regression 
in Column (ii) adds a quadratic time trend. The regression in Column (iii) includes 
a linear time trend as well as an interaction term between the smoking ban and the 
linear time trend. Finally, the regression in Column (iv) includes both trend variables, 
as well as interactions between the smoking ban and the trends. 
Again, note the sensitivity of the model to changes in specification. The coeffi-
cient on lead consumption is not significantly different from zero in Colmnn (i), but 
highly significant according to the other specifications. The coefficient on price is not 
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significant at the 5% level in the regressions that include interactio11 terms (Columns 
(iii) and (iv)). The coefficient on price is negative in the regression that includes 
linear and quadratic terms, and interactions between these trends and the smoking 
ban dummy variable. 
Table 3.9: Effect of smoking ban on consumption 
Regression uses Time trends rather than 1\Ionthly dummy variables. 
Dependent variable is per capita consumption. 
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
at- 1 0.566 0.542 0.450 0.504 
(0.077) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) 
at+t 0.132 0.397 0.553 0.512 
(0.104) (0.032) (0.021) (0 .023) 
P, -0.076 -0.022 -0.003 0.001 
(0.029) (0.011) (0.009) (0 .009) 
Yt -0.112 -0.016 0.004 0.008 
(0.051) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) 
Smoking ban 0.014 0.001 -0.010 0.115 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.015) (0.054) 
Smoking ban x t 0.688 X 10- 4 -0.002 
(0.131 X 10- 3 ) (0.001) 
Smoking ban x t 2 0.637 X 10- 5 
(0 .345 X 10- 5 ) 
t -0.275 X 10- 4 -0.202 X 10- 3 0.110 X 10- 4 -0.356 X 10- 4 
(0.280 X 10- 4 ) (0.906 X 10- 4 ) (0.873 X 10- 5 ) (0.482 X 10-4 ) 
t2 0.127 X 10- 5 0.253 X 10- 6 
(0.559 X 10- 6 ) (0.293 X 10-6 ) 
Overall effect of smoking ban at t = 105 -0.003 -0.025 
R 0.285 0.305 0.318 0.332 
N 3410 3410 3410 3410 
The• results reported in Table 3.9 are mixed, but suggest that the smoking ban 
has no contemporaneous negative effect on consumption. The regression with a linear 
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time trend only (Column (i)) yields a positive coefficient on the smoking ban dummy 
variable. Column (ii) reports a positive, but much smaller, coefficient on the smoking 
ban dummy variable from the regression that includes both linear and quadratic time 
trends. 
On the other hand, the regression that includes a linear time trend and an inter-
action term between the smoking ban dummy variable and the trend (Column (iii)) 
yields a negative and insignificant coefficient on the dummy variable. Unexpectedly, 
the coefficients on the interaction term and the linear time trend are positive, indi-
cating that the overall time trend is positive, and becomes steeper after the smoking 
ban goes into effect. As in the analysis without the smoking ban dummy variable, 
this anomalous result may be due in part to the presence of lag and lead consumption 
in the model. Lastly, noting that the smoking ban occms at week t = 105, per capita 
consumption the first week after the ban is 0.003 packs less than it would be without 
the ban, assuming that the model in Column (iii) is the correct model. The positive 
coefficient on the interaction term implies that by October of 1998 (week 146), the 
per capita consumption is greater than it would be without. the ban. 
Lastly, consider the regression that. includes linear and quadratic time trends, 
as well as interactions (Column (iv)) . The coefficient. on the smoking ban dummy 
variable is positive, but. given the coefficients on the smoking ban dummy variable 
and the interaction terms, per capita consumption the first week after the ban is 0.025 
packs less than it would be in the absence of the ban. 
It. would not be too smprising to find that. the smoking ban has no short. term 
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effect on consumption for a number of reasons. To begin with, other studies of 
smoke-free workplace laws have found small effects, if any, on cigarette consumption. 
Evans, Farrelly and Montgomery (1999) find that. smoke-free workplace bans decrease 
smoking participation among workers by 5%, and decrease consumption by about 
10% among workers who arc current smokers. Bar and restaurant workers who would 
be affected by the ban on smoking comprise about 3% of California's population 
according to estimates from the 1990 Census. 
In a study of smoking among college students, Chaloupka and Wechsler (1997) 
find that workplace smoking bans have no effect on cigarette demand or smoking 
participation. They find that restaurant smoking bans have a small negative effect 
on smoking participation, but no effect on cigarette demand. 
Casual observation suggests that there is a significant population of smokers who 
only smoke when they drink alcohol. The smoking ban may have the most significant 
effect on these casual smokers, but. this effect may not be picked up by the gro-
cery store data used in this analysis. Casual smokers may be less likely to purchase 
cigarettes at the grocery store during a regular grocery shopping trip. Rather, they 
seem more likely to buy cigarettes from a gas station, convenience store, or cigarette 
machine at a bar or restaurant while they are out for the night. 
Lastly, there was (and still is) much uncertainty surrounding t.hc ban. The effective 
date had already been postponed once. The original legislation (California Assembly 
Bill 13) , signed by the governor on July 21, 1994, had set an implementation date 
of January 1, 1997. In September 1996, lawmakers approved Assembly Bill 3037 
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which postponed the implementa tion date until January 1, 1998. Through mid-1997, 
the Assembly debated an additional one year postponement of the ban . Even after 
implem entation, California lawmakers are still discussing repealing t he ban. 
Proposition 10 Tax Increase 
If consumers use all available information to forecast prices, the passage of Proposition 
10 should lead them to incorporate the upcoming 50 cen t tax increase into their fu ture 
price forecast. Therefore, to forecast lead prices, I usc current price and two lags of 
prices and a dichotomous variable for the pending tax hike. This dummy variable is 
equal to one in the two weeks b efore J anuary 1, 1999, in any California market and 
zero for all other dates and a ll other markets. Note th at this t ime period coincides 
with the tobacco litigation settlement. I3ccause the Proposition 10 tax increase applies 
to California consumers only, whereas the unanticipated tobacco settlement price 
increase applies to consumers in a ll states, I can separa tely identify the effects of 
these two price increases. That is , the price forecast equa tion includes an indicator 
variable, denoted as Dec98, tha t is a dummy variable on the las t two weeks of 1998 to 
con trol for the effects of the tobacco li tigation settlement price increase. The variable 
denoted as Prop10 is the interaction between the indicator on the last two weeks of 
1998 and a California state dummy variable. 
The price forecast equation is: 
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Table 3.10 reports the price forecast. regression results. 
Table 3.10: Price forecast. includes Prop 10 indicator 
Dependent. variable is fnt.me price. 
fixed trends no fixed trends 
(i) (ii) 
Pt 0.909 0.911 
(0.168) (0.017) 
Pt-1 0.072 0.072 
(0.023) (0.023) 
Pt-2 0.013 0.012 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Dec98 -0.003 -0.006 
(0.012) (0.012) 
Prop10 0.102 0.106 
(0.016) (0.016) 
R 0.987 0.987 
N 3432 3432 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Dec98 is the dummy varia ble 
on the last two weeks of 1998. Prop10 is the indicator variable on 
t he last two weeks of 1998, if the state is California. For Column 
(i) the forecast also includes st a te-specific time trends and for 
Column (ii) , the forecast also includes a genC'ral time trend. 
The resul ts in Table 3.10 are comparable t.o those reported in Table 3.5, Columns 
(i) and (ii). As in the price forecasts that. do not. include the Prop10 or Dec98 indica-
tors, these resu lts indicate that current price predicts future price very closely. The 
coefficients on one-period lagged price arc small, but. significant. , and the coefficients 
on two-period lagged prices are not significantly different. from zero. The coefficient. 
on the indicator for the last. two weeks of December is negative, but. not. significantly 
different from zero. This is not. surprising given that., holding the upcoming Proposi-
t.ion 10 tax increase in California fixed , together with holding current. price and two 
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lags of price fixed , the last two weeks of December 1998 should not affe>ct future pr ice. 
Lastly, the coefficient on the Prop10 variable is positive and significant , as expected . 
The impending tax hike d ocs affect. future prices. 
Table 11 rep orts the results from 2SLS regression using expected lead prices rather 
than actual lead prices. Comparison be tween these results and those reported in Table 
3 .6, Columns (i) and (ii ) , y ields insight as to how the inclusion of the Prop10 variable 
in the price forecasts affects the 2SLS regression results . 
Compare the results from the m odel tha t includes st a te-sp ecific time trends (T able 
3 .11 , Column (i) vs . T able 3 .6 , Column (i)) . The estima tes arc not much affect ed by 
the inclusion of the Prop osition 10 variable. In fact , the differences arc most likely 
no t sta tistically significant. When t he impending tax hike is included in the price 
forecast , the coefficients on lagged and lead consumption are larger (0.257 vs. 0.235 
for the coefficient on a t - l, and 0.419 vs. 0.400 for a t+1) and the implied discount ra te 
is also slight ly larger (0.614 vs. 0.588) . The coefficient on price and the estima ted 
sh ort nm price elas ticities a rc smaller , and the coefficien t on incom e is also sligh t ly 
sm aller. 
Consider the results from the model tha t does not include sta te-specific time 
t rends. T he coefficient on lagged consumption is larger (0.428 vs. 0.367) and the 
coefficient on expected lead consumption is smaller (0.204 vs. 0.288) which implies 
a sm aller discount ra te (0 .477 vs. 0.785) . The coefficients on price and incom e arc 
similar. 
Comparison across columns reveals the previously identified relationship when 
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state-specific time trends arc included in the regression: the coefficient on lead con-
sumpt.ion is greater than the coefficient on lagged consumption. Once again, a Wald 
test indicates that the hypothesis that state-specific time trends arc jointly zero can 
be rejected 11 . 
Table 3.11: 2SLS Estimation of Equation 3.2 
Expected price forecast includes Prop10 indicator. 
Dependent variable is per capita consumption. 
fixed trends no fixed trends 
(i) (ii) 
at-1 0.257 0.428 
(0.057) (0.064) 
0.419 0.204 
(0 .069) (0.074) 
-O.ll7 -0.134 
(0.024) (0.027) 
[-1.973] [-1.480] 
-0.079 -0.089 
(0.025) (0.031) 
R 0.336 0.320 
N 3370 3370 
Standard errors arc in parentheses. Additional regressors in both 
columns are full sets of dummy variables for state and month. Addi-
tional regressors in the first column are state-specific time trends. 
First stage regressions 
Dependent variable is per capita consumption. 
Pt -0.047 -0.635 
(0.362) (0.345) 
Pt- 1 -0.089 -0.157 
(0.066) (0.066) 
E [Pt+1] -0.209 0.475 
(0.395) (0.380) 
-2 
R 0.335 0.315 
As in the first stage regression results reported i11 Table 3.6, the first stage ro-
11 F[5, 3318] = 4.678 
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gression resnlts reported in Table 3.11 are not as expected, due in part to the high 
correlation between E [Pt+l] and Pt. In the first stage regression results for the model 
that includes state-specific time trends, the signs on the coefficients are all negative, 
as expected, but are not precisely estimated. In the resnlts for the model that does 
not include state-specific time trends, only the coefficient on lagged price is negative. 
To compare the model that includes the Proposition 10 indicator with the one that 
does not, I apply Davidson and McKinnon's J test to the second stage, becanse neither 
model nests the other. Unfortnnately, nsing the Davidson and McKinnon J test to 
compare the various models yields inconclusive results. For example, in comparing the 
models that inclnde state-specific time trends, the coefficient on the model withont 
the ProplO variable is -0.242 with a standard error of 2.93 , and therefore, this model 
is rejected in favor of the model that includes the Prop10 variable in the price forecast. 
However, the coefficient on the model that includes Prop10 is -0.057 with a standard 
error of 0.166, and therefore, this model is rejected in favor of the model without the 
Prop10 variable in the price forecast. Likewise, comparing the model discnssed in 
this section with the model that uses actual future consumption as a right-hand side 
variable yields the same inconclusive results. 
Tobacco Settlement Price Increase and Proposition 10 Tax Increase 
It is difficult to assess the effects of the tobacco settlement price increase and the 
Proposition 10 tax increase, because they occur during the same t ime p eriod, even 
though the former affects all five states in the data, whereas the t ax increase affects 
California only. However , the tobacco settlem ent price increase is unanticipated, 
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wherC'as th0 Proposition 10 tax increase is anticipated. The rational model predicts 
that. consumers will act. in advance of an anticipated tax or price hike, because they 
anticipate that. their consumption after the tax hike will decrease. 
As a cursory glance at the effects of the tobacco settlement price increase and 
the Proposition 10 tax increase in California, consider again Figme 3.1. Ignoring the 
slight hoarding effects the week of the tax and price increases, the levels of consump-
tion appear to decrease below the original levels before the tobacco settlement price 
increase. In California, after the Proposition 10 tax increase, the consumption level 
again decreases. Holding all else equal , the rational model predicts not only that 
Californians should decrease consumption in reaction to the tobacco settlement, but 
during the same time period, they should fmther decre&<Je consumption in anticipa-
tion of the Proposition 10 tax increase. In the five weeks before the California election, 
consumption averages 0.189 packs per capita. In the eight weeks after the election, 
but before the tax increase, consumption averages 0.186 packs per person. Following 
the tax hike, consumption averages 0.147 pack per person. Without holding other 
effects such as price or time fixed , it appears that consumption has decreased sligh tly 
in anticipation of the imminent tax increase, as the rational model predicts. However, 
consider the consumption pattern of the other fom states which do not have the 50 
cent tax increase. Before November 3, 1998, average per capita consumption is 0.208. 
Between November 3 and January 1, 1999, average p er capita consumption is 0.199 
and after January 1, it is 0.173. In Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, and Washington, in 
which consumers are reacting to the tobacco settlement price increase, consumption 
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decreases by about 4%. On the other hand, in California, consumption decreases by 
less than 2%. Comparison of these figures suggests that, contrary to the prediction of 
the rational model, cigarette consumers in California did not decrease consumption 
in anticipation of the Proposition 10 tax increase. 
Of course, this is not a rigorous test of the rational model, because it ignores 
all other factors that affect consumption. An alternative approach is to compare 
the rational model with a restricted version of the model in which the coefficient on 
future consumption is constrained to be zero. The rational model predicts that the 
reaction will be different depending on whether the price increase is anticipated or 
unanticipated. A model in which addicts are not forward-looking, however, predicts 
the same reaction. 
I use the full sample to estimate two models. The first is the rational addiction 
model with a linear time trend and state-specific dummy variables. The second is 
a restricted rational addiction model where the coefficient on lead consumption is 
constrained to be zero. Previous authors refer to this model as "myopic addiction." 
In the unrestricted model, I assume that agents forecast prices using the model in the 
previous section. Using the estimated coefficients, I predict per capita consumption 
for the period between January, 1999 and May, 1999. The estimation results are in 
Table 12.12 
12 A better test of the models may be to estimate the two models using only the first 143 weeks 
of data (through the end of September, 1998). Using these estimates to forecast consumption for 
the next 32 weeks (i.e. , out of sample), I could then compare the forecasts with actual per capita 
consumption. However, in the first 143 weeks of the dataset , there are no price increases that 
are nearly as large as the ones following the tobacco settlement and the implementation of the 
Proposition 10 tax increase. \Vithout the price changes, it appears that the estimates of the models 
are driven by noise. For example, using only the 143 weeks of data to estimate the unrestricted model 
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Table 3.12: 2SLS Estimation of Equation 3.2 with time trend 
Dependent variable is per capita consmnption. 
t 
R 
N 
Unrestric ted model 
(i) 
0.578 
(0.031) 
0.311 
(0.049) 
-0.032 
(0.014) 
-0.038 
(0.024) 
0.0021 
(0.0113) 
0.281 
3370 
Restric ted model (at+l = 0) 
(ii) 
0.488 
(0.033) 
-0.124 
(0.008) 
-0.196 
(0 .015) 
-0.0001 
(0.0111) 
0.280 
3374 
Addit ional regressors a re dummy varia bles for s ta te. 
Note, from Table 3.12, tha t the estimated coefficient on price is almost three times 
as large in the restric ted model than in the unrestricted model. The coefficient on 
lagged consumption is smaller , and the coefficient on income is almost four times as 
la rge in the restricted model than in the unrestricted model. 
Using the estima tes in Table 3.12, I predict per capita consumption for Oct ober , 
1998, through May, 1999. For the right-hand side variable of lead consmnption in the 
unrestricted model , I use the reduced form predictions for lead consumption. The 
sum of squared devia tions between actual per capita consumption and consumption 
predicted by the unrestricted model is 2.48. The sum of squared deviations between 
actual consumption and consumption predicted by the restricted model is 3.37. 
gives insignificant estimates of the coefficients on lagged and lead consumption. In fact, the coefficient 
on lagged consumption is negative. Furthermore, the coefficient on price is over 5 times as la rge as 
the coefficient that results from estimation using the full sample. Using these estimates to predic t 
consumption for October , 1998 , through ~Iay, 1999, yields predictions of negative consumption in 
both models. 
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Figure 3.4 plots the average of realized p er capita consumption for m arkets in 
California, as well as predicted values for both the restricted and unrestricted models . 
Figure 3.5 plots the average of realized p er capita consumption for markets in the 
other s tates, along with the predic ted values. 
Examination of both figures reveals that the models' predictions are very close to 
one another. Consider Figure 3.4 first. Both models p erform well until the tobacco 
settlem ent price increase. At that time, the models overreact to the price increase. 
At the January 1, 1999 tax hike, both models again predict a s tronger reaction than 
actually occurred. 
Figure 3.5 reveals that the models predict p er capita consumption much better 
in the other states than in California. Before the tobacco settlem ent, the predicted 
values of consumption are higher than actual consumption. As with the California 
da t a, the models predict stronger responses to the price increase than actu ally occur. 
Therefore, after the price increase, the predictions from both models follow actu al 
consumption closely. 
The unrestricted m odel does slightly better than the restricted model. The pre-
dictions of the restricted and the unrestricted models are very simila r , even though 
the unrestricted model should predict a different reaction to an unanticipated price 
ch ange than a n anticipated price ch ange, whereas it is irrelevant to the restricted 
model whether a price change is anticipated or unanticipated. However , the predic-
tions are more simila r in the oth er states, in which all price changes a re unanticipated, 
as the rational model would predict. One possibility is t hat both price ch a nges are 
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unanticipated to the consumers: California consumers did not anticipate the Propo-
sition 10 tax hike, despite the election and publicity surrounding the proposition. 
Another possibility is that. the stores began raising prices prior t.o t.he tax hike, and 
the models predict that the consumers are merely responding to the price increases. 
Lastly note that neither the unrestricted nor the restricted model predicts the 
hoarding of cigarettes that occurs, most noticeably in the last week of December. 
Even though the data used in this analysis measure sales, the model of rational 
addiction (as well as the restricted model) describes consumption behavior, rather 
than purchasing b ehavior, and therefore, does not predict hoarding. 
In fact, when the analysis is applied using aggregated monthly data, rather than 
weekly data, so that the effects of hoarding arc smoothed over, predicted consump-
tion more closely follows actual consumption. The mean squared deviation between 
actual per capita consumption and consumption predicted by the unrestricted model 
is 0.0035 and the mean squared deviation between actual and predicted consumption 
for the restricted model is 0.0014, which are less than the mean squared deviations 
from the original analysis in which weekly data was used. 
Hoarding behavior is not inconsistent with the rational addiction model. If the 
anticipated tax hike will not cause an agent to quit smoking, then subject to bud-
get and storage constraints, it is forward-looking and utility-maximizing to hoard 
cigarettes before the tax increase. It is not clear what the optimal level of hoarding 
is, but the consumers represented in this dataset do not appear to be hoarding very 
much. There is a small spike in sales in the week of the tobacco settlement price 
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hike, the week ending November 29, and there is la rger spike in sales the last week 
of December. A finding that consumers do not hoard enough would lend suppor t to 
studies that have found that consumers engage in p urcha.se quantity rationing when 
pnrcha..sing goods tha t are vices, such as cigarettes (sec Wcr tcnbroch , 1998). 
3.6 A Methodological Note on Measurement Er-
ror and Serial Correlation 
T he positive and significant coefficient on future (or expected fu tnrc) consumption 
may imply tha t consumers a rc indeed forward looking and ra tional. However , there 
are some serious issues tha t this test of ra tional addiction r aises. One issue is the 
question of how seria l correla tion might affect the estimates. Recall from Fignrcs 
3.1 and 3.2 tha t cigarette sales follow a general upward t rend, while prices follow a 
general downward trend. It is p ossible that the coefficien t on fu ture consumption is 
picking up the serial correla tion t hat is not fully accounted for by the time t rend and 
time varia tion variables. 
A rela ted issue is that the p ositive and significant coefficient may simply be a sta-
tistical artifact dne to mcasnrcment error. Grether and Maddala (1973) demonstrate 
how measm ement error in t he independent variable can lead to a non-zero coefficient 
on lags of the independen t or dep endent variables, even when the t rue model contains 
no lags. Following the same typ e of ana lysis , we can show tha t measurement error 
in the dependent variable can also result in biased coefficients on lags or leads of 
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dependent variables 
Suppose, for simplicity, that consumption of addictive goods depends only on 
current price, which is exogenously given. For case of exposition, let the variables be 
expressed as deviations from their means. Then the true model is given by: 
(3.5) 
where, as before, at and Pt are consumption and price, respectively, at time t. How-
ever , instead of observing consumption, we observe expenditures, state tax receipts, 
or p erhaps survey n 'sponscs. That is, we observe 
where '17t is measurement error. Assume 
E [et] = E [ryt] = 0 
and for all j , 
Lastly, to simplify the computation, assume 
E[Pt] = 0 
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Now, su ppose the econometric model is misspecified as 
(3.6) 
Then the estima ted model yields 
In the limit, the least squares estimate of (3 is given by: 
(3.7) 
where 
Using sample variances and covariances of sales and pr ices from the IRI d ata, the 
bias is estimated to be 0.9912, assuming that the coefficient on lead consumption is 
zero. 
Now suppose tha t. the true model is given by Equa tion (3 .6) rather t han Equation 
(3.5), but consumption is again mcasm ccl with error. In the limit, we can show tha t 
(3.8) 
Derivation of Equations (3.7) and (3.8) can be found in the Appendix. 
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If there is no serial correla tion in the measuremen t. error , then the second term 
drops ont and the estima te of (3 is biased towmd zero hecanse the denominator of the 
firs t term is always greater t han the nnmerator. Notice tha t t his bias toward zero is 
similar to the downward bias that rcsnlts from the classical problem of measurement 
error in an independent. variable. The sign of the second t erm depends on the seria l 
correla tion of the measnrem ent error. If the errors arc positively correlated , then the 
estima te of (3 is even smaller , assnming that (3 is positive. On the other hand, if 
the errors are negatively correlated , the sign of the second t erm is negative, and it is 
inconclnsivc as to whether or not (3 is biased downward. 
This measnremcnt error bias may have affected the analysis of Keeler , e t al. (1993) 
in which they estima te the ra tional modcl nsing California st a te cigarette and t obacco 
tax data. In their analysis, ra ther than one-period lagged and lead consmn ption , they 
nse previons 12 month and snbseqnent 12 month moving averages, rC'sp ectivcly. They 
argne: "Usc of only one-month lead and lag valncs in [Eqnation (3.1 )] genera ted 
nonsense resnlts qnite anithetical to the ra tional-addic tion hy pothesis, sp ecifically 
insignificant and/ or negative valnes of both lead and lagged qnanti ty demanded ." 
(p.14) 
3.7 Conclusion 
Previons empirical s tndies of addictive goods typically nse either st ate cigarette tax 
receipt da ta or survey da ta. Analysis of grocery store scanner da ta is a promising 
approach to the empirical s tndy of cigarette addiction. Unlike tax receipt data, 
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grocery store sales reflect sales to consumers rather than sales by distribu tors to 
wholesalers or retailers. Furthermore, grocery store sales data have the advan tage 
over survey data that there is no concern about adjusting answers due to social 
conformity. 
The results I find are mixed with respect to the rational addiction model, and 
there are som e important issues raised. The results arc very sensitive to econometric 
specification , and som e results arc difficult to reconcile within the rational fram ework. 
For example, in the regressions that include a linear time trend rather than monthly 
variation (Tables 3.8 and 3.9), the coefficient on lead consumption is not. significantly 
different from zero. Furthermore, the specifications of the model with state-specific 
time trends fit the data bett er than those without.. However , when state-specific time 
trends arc included in the model, the coefficients on lagged consumption are smaller 
than the coefficients on lead consumption , y ielding point estima tes of discount rates 
that exceed unity. 
I believe that. the model represented by Equation (3.2), in which current consump-
tion depends on expected future consumption rather than act.nal future consumption, 
as in the m odel represented by Equation (3.1), is the more realistic model. It is note-
worthy that, although model (3.2) uses less informat ion (in particular, actua l future 
consumption is not included in the model), model (3.2) docs equally well, if not bet-
ter, a t. explaining variation in the dep endent variable than model (3. 1). Furthermore, 
the data reveal strong downward trends in consumption that differ across states, and 
I reject the hypothesis that the state-specific t ime trends arc JOintly zero in all regrcs-
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sions in which they a re included. Therefore, t.he results I focus on are t hose given in 
Table 3. 11 , Column (i) based on model (3.2) with state-specific time trends. Support 
for the rational addiction model is found in that. the coefficients on pas t and exp ected 
futnre consumption are positive and significant. However, as mentiorwd above, the 
results also ca.c.;t doubt on t.he rational addiction model because of the negative point 
estimate of the rate of time preference. 
Fmthermore, the analyses that use price forecasts raise questions about the va-
lidity of lagged and lead prices a.c.; instruments. However, the majority of empirical 
studies rely on the validity of these instruments. 
In analyzing the effects of policy chang<'S, I find that the ban on smoking in bars 
and restaurants docs not. have a contemporaneous negative effect. on consumption of 
cigarettes. In comparing the effects of an anticipated tax change with the effects of 
an unanticipated price change, I find that. an unrestricted ra tional addiction mod el 
performs slightly better than a model in which the coefficient on future consumption 
is restricted t.o b e zero. 
This analysis may not adequately account for t.he correla tion structure of these 
panel data. For example, it does appear that the errors arc serially correlated. Fur-
thcnnore, the price foreca.<>t equation estimates also suggest strong correlation be-
tween prices realized in adjacent periods. It should be recognized, however , that. 
this analysis, as well as previous empirical studies, have found that the econometric 
implementation of the rational model is not very robust to different specifications. 
Therefore, although investigating the degree of serial correlation in the data may be 
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fruitful , correcting for serial correla tion m ay not off0r more insight . 
A larger project would involve conducting a sim ilar econom etric analysis using 
simila r da ta on sales of goods tha t are believed to b e n on-addictive. Because m any of 
the issues ra ised are problems with the econometric specification of the m odel, rather 
than the theoretical m odel itself, using consumption of other non-addic tive goods 
as a comparison could help differentia te results th a t are a rtifacts of t he econom etric 
sp ecification from results th a t. lend support to the rational model. 
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Chapter 4 Conclusion 
This dissertation presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of consumption of ad-
dictive goods. 
The pattern of quitting and relapse that is prevalent among substance abusers 
has proved to be a difficult problem for addiction researchers from all fields. Previous 
economic research on addiction has not fully utilized findings from other disciplines . 
Research on people's misjudgment of the severity of future consequences of substance 
use explain why people might begin to usc an addictive substance that they eventually 
choose to quit. Research on conditioned responses sheds light on why addicts who 
decide to stop using addictive substances begin to consume again, even though they 
no longer have misperceptions about the negative effects of consumption. 
I develop a model of addiction of addictive goods that departs from conventional 
models of consumption in two ways: first, by introducing craving that can be induced 
by the presence of environmental cues such as locations, persons, or drug parapher-
nalia, and second, by allowing for the possibility that individuals misperceive the 
severity of the future consequences from consuming addictive substances. Whereas 
for addicts in "rational addiction" models addiction is simply a utility-maximizing 
decision, addicts in my model may experience regret and could improve their welfare 
by controlling or eliminating environmental cues that generate cravings. Agents in 
my model may exhibit consumption patterns that resemble a pattern of quitting and 
127 
relapse. 
The third chapter presents an empirical analysis of the Becker and 1\Inrphy model 
of rational addiction using data on grocery store sales of cigarettes. Analysis of 
grocery store scanner data on cigarette sales is a promising approach to the empirical 
study of cigarette addiction. Unlike tax receipt data, grocery store sales reflect sales 
to consumers rather than sales by distributors to wholesalers or retailers. Sales data 
also have an advantage over survey data in that there is no concern about adjusting 
answers due to social conformity. 
The results I find arc mixed with respect to the rational model, but there arc 
some important issues raised. First of all , the results arc very sensitive to econometric 
specification, and some results arc difficult to reconcile within the rationa l framework. 
Secondly, the analyses that usc price forecasts raise questions about the validity of 
lagged and lead prices as instruments, an approach adopted in previous empirical 
studies. 
I analyze the effects of three policy changes: the implementation of the California 
Smokc-Ftec Workplace ban on smoking in bars and restaurants; a. nationwide price 
increase due to a settlement between tobaC'C'o companies and state governments; and 
a 50 cent tax increase in California. I find that the ban on smoking in bars and restau-
rants does not have a contemporaneous negative effect on consumption of cigarettes. 
I compare the effects of an anticipated tax change with those of an unanticipated 
price change. The rational addiction model predicts that, because agents are forward-
looking and because of the lark of intertemporal seperability with respect to addictive 
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goods, agents' behavior will changc in advance of an anticipated price change. Indeed, 
I find t.hat an unrestricted rational addiction model performs slightly better than a 
model in which t.he coefficient on future consumption is restrict.cd t.o be zero. 
A future project would focus on distinguishing between t.he rational modcl of 
addiction and various behavioral models of addiction, including my own. Because the 
various models have been designed t.o explain why individuals would become addicts 
using a decision-theoretic framework, many of these modcls yield similar observable 
outcomes. It is important to develop sharp predictions t.hat are empirically testable 
in order to distinguish between t.hc various models. For example, the models might 
diffcr in their predictions as t.o whether people will seek treatment and the success of 
treatment programs. Alternatively, t.he models might. predict different. responscs t.o 
price changes or policy changes. 
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Appendix A Proof Appendix 
For case of exposition, let w(a) = u(y- pa, a) and let U(a) = w(a) + 11(a, x) and 
iJ(a) = w(a) + v(a, x). 
Pr·oof of Proposition 1: By om a.';;snmpt.ions on u(-, · ), v(- , ·) and v(·, · ), the partial 
derivative of cmrent ntili ty (with the perceived tolerance fnnction) with respect to 
the consnmption stock, which is given by 
a 
ax [w(~(x'- ax))+ v(~(x'- ax),x)] 
-~w'(~(x'- ax))- ~v1 (~(x' - ax) , x) + v2 (~(x'- ax) , x) 
and the partial derivative of cnrrent ntili ty (with the true tolerance fnnction) with 
respect to the consn mption stock, which is given by 
a 
ax [ w ( ~ ( x' - ax)) + v ( ~ ( x' - ax) , x)] = 
-~w'(~(x' - ax)) - ~v1 (~(x' - ax),x) + v2 (~(x'- ax) ,x) 
a rc both strictly increasing x'. The assumptions on the ntility and tolerance functions 
satisfy Assnmptions 1-4 of Orphanides and Zervos (1994) , and therefore their Lemmas 
2 and 3 and Proposition 1 apply. I 
Proof of Proposition 2: I will prove 
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The proof for 
is t.hc same. Begin by proving t.hc following Lemma 
Lemma 7 If V * () is the solution to 
then 
Proof: 
V*(x) 
V*(x) =max f.£ [w (a)+ 11(a, .r) + oV*(ax + ,Ba)J + (1 - f.L) V"(.z:) 
a 
V"( ) f.L vsE( lo Of.£ ) 
X = 1 - 0(1 - f.L) X = 1 - 0(1 - f.L) 
f.L vsE(xl Of.£ ) 
1 - o(1 - f.L) 1 - o(1 - f.L) 
max U(a, x) + V J(ax + .Bal ) f.L [ Of.£ SE Of.£ ] 
aE(O, ~ J 1 - 0(1 - f.L) 1 - 0(1 - f.L) 1 - 0(1 - f.L) 
max ot ) [U(a, x) + bV*(ax + ,Ba)] 
aE(O , ~ J 1 - 1 - f.L 
- max f.L [U(a, x) + oV*(ax + ,Ba)] + (1 - Jl)OV*(x) 
aE(O, ~ J 
Now, let 
and show that 
I 
J1 vsE (.z:A lo = Of.L ) + 1 - f.L vsE (xJJ lo = o(1 - J1)) 
1 -o(l-f.£) 1 - 0(1 - f.£) 1 - 0f.£ 1 - 0f.£ 
- V *(xAIP: = 11) + V*(xBIP: = 1 - 11) 
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max 1-" [U(aA,xA) + 8V*(axA + ,BaA!f.t) + 8V*(x8 !1 -!-")] 
aAE(O,~j 
+ max (1 - !-") [U(a8 , x 0 ) + 8V*(~xiJ + ,6a8 !1 - !-") + 8V*(xA!1-")] 
aBE[O, ~j 
max 1-" [U(aA,xA) +8V(axA +,6a11 ,x8 )] 
aAE[O,;J 
+ max (1 -- !-") [U(a 8 , x 8 ) + 8V(xA, ax8 + ,6a8 )] 
aB E[o,;J 
I 
Proof of Proposition 3: By om assumption s on u(· , ·), v(·, ·)and v(·, ·), marginalutil-
ity (with the perceived tolerance function) with respect to the consumption stock, 
which is given by 
a 
Dx [w(~(x' - ~x)) + v(~(x'- ax),x)] 
-; w' ( ~ ( x' - ax)) - ; v1 ( ~ ( x' - ax), x) + 112 ( ~ ( x' - ax), x) 
and marginal utility (with the trne tolerance function ) with respect to the consump-
tion stock , which is given by 
a 
ox [ w ( ~ ( x' - ax)) + v ( ~ (.c' - ax), x)] 
- ~ w' ( ~ ( x' - ax)) - ~ v1 ( ~ ( x' - ~x), x) + 112 ( ~ ( x' - ~x) , x) 
are both strictly increasing x'. The assumptions on the utility and tolerance functions 
satisfy Assumptions 1-4 of Orphanides and Zervos (1994), and therefore their Lemmas 
2 and 3 and Proposition 1 apply to the policy correspondences ;{;A ( x), ;j 8 ( x), 'lj;A ( x) 
I 
Proof of Proposition 4: Begin by proving the following Lemma 
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Lemma 8 If V* () is the solution to 
V*(x) = m~xf.L [ujt(a , x) + 8V*(ax +/)a)]+ (1- J.L) V*(x) 
then 
V*(x) = f.L Wjt (xi8 = 8J.L ) 
1 - 8(1 - J.L) 1 - 8(1 - J.L) 
for j =A, B. 
Proof: 
V*(x) J.L wjt (xl8 = 8J.L ) 
1-8(1-J.L) 1 - 8(1-J.L) 
max U1 t(a, x) + W 1t(ax + /Jal ) J.L [ - 8J.L ~. 8f.L ] 
aE[O , ~j 1 - 8(1 - J.L) 1 - 8(1 - J.L) 1 - 8(1- f.L) 
max 
8
t ) [ifjt(a , x) + 8V*(ax +/)a)] 
aE[O , ~J 1 - 1 - f.L 
max f.L [ifJt(a , x) + 8V*(ax +/)a)] + (1- J.L)8V*(x) 
aE[O , ~j 
I 
Now, let 
and show that 
~~ f.L [ifAt(aA , XA) + 8Vt(axA + /)aA, x 8 )] 
+ (1 - J.L) [ifBt(a 8 , x 8 ) + 8Vt(XA , QXA + /)a 8 )] 
J.L wAt(xAI8 = 8f.L ) + 1- J.L wat(xal8 = 8(1- J.L)) 
1-8(1-J.L) 1 - 8(1-J.L) 1-8f.L 1 - 8f.L 
V*(xAIJ:L = J.L) + V*(x 8 i}:L = 1 - tt) 
max J.L [ifAt(aA , xA) + 8V*(axA + /)aAiJ.L) + 8V*(x 8 i1- f.L)] 
aA E[O,~ J 
+ max (1- J.L) [if 8 t(a8 , x8 ) + 8V*(ax 8 + /)a8 i1- J.L) + 8V*(xAiJ.L)] 
a8 E[O , ~j 
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max JL [fJAt(aA, xA) + oV(axA + f3aA, x 8 )] 
aAE(O,;J 
+ max (1 - JL) [U81 (a8 , x 8 ) + oV(xA, ax8 + f3a8 )] 
aBE(O,;J 
I 
Proof of Proposition 5: By om assumptions on u(-, ·)and v11 (-, ·) , perceived marginal 
utility in environment. A with respect to the consumpt iou stock, which is given by 
f) 
EJx 
and perceived marginal utility in environment B wit.h respect. to the consumption 
stock, which is given by 
f) 
EJx 
are both strictly increasing x' for all t. The assumptions on the utility and tolerance 
functions satisfy Assumptions 1-4 of Orphanides and Zervos (1994), and therefore 
their Lemmas 2 and 3 and Proposi t.ion 1 apply. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Begin by proving the following Lemma 
Lemma 9 If V* () is the solution to 
V*(x , ::Y) = maxJL [U(a, x, ::Y) + 8V*(ax + f3a, g (::Y, 1))] + (1- JL) V*(x , ::Y) 
a 
then 
I 
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Proof: 
V"(x , ;;) 
J-L W ( -~ 6J-L ) X '"'( 
1 -6(1 - J-L) ) 1 -6(1 - J-L) 
J-L [ _ 6J-L _ 6J-L ] 
a~~~] 1 - 6(1- J-L) U(a, x, '"'t) + 1 - 6(1- J-L) W(ax + (3a , g ('"Y, '"Y) 11- 6(1- J-L)) 
max 
6
t ) [U(a, x , ;y) + 6V*(ax + (3a, g (;;, '"'t))] 
aE[O,;J 1 - 1 - J-L 
max J-L [U(a, x , ;;) + 6V*(ax + (3a, g (;;, '"'t))] + (1- J-L)6V*(x) 
aE[O,;J 
Now, let 
t-,A B - /A -B~ ( A -A~ 6j.L ) 1- J-L ( B -a~ 6 6(1- J-L)) V \"' '1$ -' 8( 1' ]_ ~) W X ' '"'( 6 = 1 - 6 ( 1 - J-L) + 1 - 6 J-L W X ' '"'( = 1 - 6 J-L 
and show that 
J-L A -A 6j.L 1 - J-L B -B 6(1 - J-L) 
1 - 6(1- J-L) W(x ''"Y 11 - 6(1 - J-L)) + 1 - 6J-L W(x ''"Y I 1 - 6J-L ) 
V*(xA,;yAIJ:L = J-L) + V*(xa ,;yalf:L = 1- J-L) 
max J-L[U(aA ,xA,;yA) + 6V*(axA + (3aA, g(;yA,'"'f) IJ-L) + 8V*(x8 ,;y8 ll- J-L)] 
aAE[O,;J 
I 
+ max (1- J-L) [U(a8 ,x8 ,;y8 ) + 8V*(ax 8 + (3a8 ,g(::Y8 ,'"'f)l1- J-L) + 6V*(xA,;yAIJ-L)] 
a 8 E[0,;J 
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;na[ Xll j.t [U(aA , XA, ::YA) + 8V(axA +,BaA , x 8 , g(::YA, /), ::Y8 )] 
a~ E 0, PI 
+ max (1 - p,) [U(a 8 ,x8 ,::Y8 ) + 8V(xA,ax8 + ,8a8 ,::YA,g(::Y8 ,!))] 
aBE[O,;J 
I 
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Appendix B 
(3.8) 
Derivation of Equations (3. 7) and 
I'll begin with the derivation of equation (3. 7) 
(3~ = Ozz(l)o},- OpzOpz( l ) 
') 2 2 ( ) a;ap- Opz 1 
Recall that the model that is estimated is 
In the limit, the least squares estimate'S are given by: 
L ( -Zt + iJzt+l + -::ypt) Zt+l 0 
t 
L ( -Zt + 1Jzt+1 + -::ypt ) Pt 0 
I 
or 
~ 
Therefore, (3 is given by 
Taking limits, we arrive at.: 
fj = Ozz( l )ai,- OpzOpz( l ) 
a;a;,- a~z (l) 
Now, t.o derive equation (3.8), suppose that the true coefficient on at+1 is not 0, 
that. is fJ f 0. 
f3 is given by 
or 
so that. in the limit: 
Now consider fJ 
fJ 
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fJ _ L atat+1 L P?- L atPt L at+1Pt 
- L az+l L P? - (2: at+1Pt) 2 
fJ = (}aa(1)(}~- (}ap(}pa(1) 
(}~(}~ - (}~a (1) 
(}zz( 1)(}~- (}pz (}pz ( 1) 
(}'} (}~ - (}~z (1) 
(}~ ((}aa(1)- (}7)1)(1)) - O"pa(}Pa(1) 
2 2 2 (1) + 2 2 (}a(}P- O"pa (}1)(}P 
O"~O"aa(1) - (}pa0"Pa( 1) (}~(}1)1)(1) 
fJ 
2 2 2 (1) + 2 2 (} aO" P - a Pa (}110" P 
which gives us equation (3.8): 
22 2() 22 O"aO"P - (}Pa 1 + (}11 (}P 
